The States and Higher Education

The States and Higher Education Legislative Views on the Governance of Public Colleges and Universities: Enhancing the Public Interest

Mario C. Martinez

Tables

Public higher education governance lives in the complex world of public policy. To understand such a world requires persons who see issues both from the campus and state and federal sides (Goodchild et al., 1997, p. xxiii). [End Page 247] To examine governance from the state side, this article presents findings from a recent legislative survey on higher education governance.

Past governance studies have examined structures from the perspective of those who are responsible for and satisfied with their operation (Schick et al., 1992; Jones & Skolnik, 1997), while other investigations have studied higher education autonomy in relation to the state (Berdahl, 1971; Glenny, 1959; Millet, 1984; Sabloff, 1997). Eulau and Quinley, in 1970, sought the state perspective of higher education in a historic study of legislative leaders in nine states that found a generally optimistic view of legislative faith in higher education and its role in society; however, they did not focus specifically on governance and support for higher education was particularly strong at that period.

Legislators in our survey overwhelmingly supported the concept of lay (or citizen) governance yet acknowledged that trustees have difficulty balancing their dual role of institutional advocate versus guardian of the public trust. They recognized that trustees have an increasingly complex role to fill, as they are expected to deal with issues ranging from the traditional responsibility of evaluating a president to offering suggestions about state problems. From the legislative perspective, however, all of the board's responsibilities are associated with the concept of the public interest, and many factors impact the public interest. Therefore, I will describe the board responsibilities that legislators deemed most important, the factors that impact the public interest, and any specific factors or responsibilities that can be tied to the roles of advocacy or guardianship.

Background

As another study component on the project on Strengthening the Governance of America's Public Universities, the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB) commissioned Educational Systems Research (ESR) to conduct an independent and impartial opinion survey of state legislators. The legislative findings were intended to help inform AGB's subsequent efforts to explore new strategies for strengthening public university and college governance. The general goals of the survey were to understand legislative views regarding: (a) expectations of governing boards and how well those expectations are being met; and (b) the composition, selection, and responsibilities of governing boards.

ESR and I conducted the survey; ESR then completed a report based on the findings of the survey results. AGB encouraged continued discussion of legislative responses through academic forums and/or additional analysis of the transcript data. The purpose of this article is to disseminate the survey results and to report additional qualitative and quantitative analysis conducted on the interview responses--particularly to define what trustees [End Page 248] mean by the "public interest." Legislators interviewed for this study agreed that trustees (for simplicity's sake, I include regents in this term) are selected to serve the public interest and were unanimous that a trustee must balance two roles: institutional advocate and guardian of the public trust. A majority of respondents perceived that boards were better at advocacy than guardianship, although it was not clear what responsibilities related to a given role and what factors affected trustee effectiveness.

The first section briefly describes the methods used to conduct the survey and analyze the data. The second section defines the terms legislators used to collectively define public interest and the general environment that legislators described when talking about the various public interest terms. The final section addresses how legislators believe that lay governance may be enhanced to meet the public interest.

Research Methods

In spring 1996, the Association of Governing Boards commissioned Educational Systems Research to conduct in-depth telephone interviews of state legislative leaders. A 12-question protocol, designed by ESR, structured the "focused conversation," which covered a wide range of topics related to public university governance and trusteeship. All interviews were conducted one-on-one with selected political leaders. A basic premise of the study was that the terms and vocabulary with which individuals discussed issues and concerns would provide critical clues about their perceptions of underlying problems and their likely actions toward potential solutions.

The sample included 25 current state legislators in 18 states. By design, the group interviewed was not a representative sample. AGB purposefully sought the views of those legislators whom their colleagues in state policy or higher education communities considered to be among the most knowledgeable, insightful, or influential state lawmakers on matters relating to public university governance and trusteeship. Another key consideration in determining the sample was to include a broad mix of political perspectives, governance issues, and state contexts. ABG identified these legislators over the course of a year during AGB-sponsored state site visits, focus groups, and personal conversations with governors, state legislators, university and system chief executive officers, trustees, and other interested parties.

I conducted 18 telephone interviews and ESR 7 between January 1997 and March 1997. All of the interviews were taped with the consent of the interviewee. Interviewees were assured of anonymity, and conversations ranged from a half hour to one and a half. Each interviewer then oversaw the transcription of the recording. ERS provided its transcripts to me. I then analyzed the data using qualitative and quantitative techniques. I identified themes in the interviews, coding them with a trained graduate assistant, [End Page 249] then sorted them by code to group opinions about the various themes. I also constructed two two-dimensional data matrices directly from the interview notes focusing on discussions of "public interest." Miles and Huberman (1984) advocate displaying the data in matrix form because it may then be viewed simultaneously rather than sequentially. When we read large amounts of text, for example, we are sequentially processing the information; when we look at a picture, or a matrix, we are able to see many things at once (pp. 21-22).

The first data matrix displays factors related to the functions higher education performs and public interest issues described by legislators. (See Table 1.) The second matrix focus on factors that are part of the environment in which higher education and the board operate. (See Table 2.)

The interview protocol contained a nine-part question asking the respondents to rate the importance he or she attached to certain roles and responsibilities typically associated with trustees. The analysis on this portion of the survey data used a chi-square distribution to discern if the importance legislators ascribed to different responsibilities was statistically significant. Contingency tables and descriptive statistics provided clues about which responsibilities legislators deemed most important.

The Public Interest

Ruppert's (1997) interpretation of the public interest encompasses the trustees' responsibility to serve as both buffer and bridge between the institutions or system governed and the community at large. Indeed, virtually every political leader interviewed for this study agreed that governing boards must balance two roles--one as advocate for the institution; the other as guardian of the public trust. Safeguarding the public interest, then, appears to require the consideration of both state and institutional needs, though legislators perceived that these needs may sometimes be in conflict.

During the design of the survey protocol, the actual interview process, and the analysis of the transcript data, the term "public interest" surfaced repeatedly. For example, legislators associated governing board responsibilities, desired trustee strengths (e.g., financial knowledge), and state needs with the public interest. They particularly focused on whether a governing board could unilaterally impact an aspect of public interest or whether a given issue required mutual attention between state and board, most agreeing on the need for mutual attention. One legislator insisted that a board needs to "partner with the state and work with other state agencies on specific issues," indicating a joint responsibility. In agreement, several legislators felt that individual trustees needed to take personal responsibility to become more visible at the capitol and to the public. [End Page 250]

In sum, the consensus emerging from the legislators' interviews indicated a complex field of responsibility: Some factors in the higher education environment were perceived as within the states or institution's control/influence, while others were within the control/influence of both the state and the institution, and still others lay beyond the control/influence of either. These descriptions of the board's role and influence equate with Ackoff's (1994, p. 20) three components of an open system's environment, respectively: controllable, transactional, and contextual, and I have borrowed them to describe one dimension of the data matrices.

Legislators also referred to changing demographic and economic factors in the state that influenced the political process of trustee selection, a process that may either hinder or enhance the public interest. Previous investigations of higher education finance (Leslie & Ramey, 1986; Layzell & Lyddon, 1990) concluded that socioeconomic, political, and historical forces all affected higher education funding. Similarly, a second dimension that characterizes the political, social, economic, and even historical aspects of the public interest was evident in the interview data.

Matrix Analysis

I grouped several words and phrases from the interviews that referred to the domain of public interest. Table 1 displays those mentioned by three or more legislators. It is difficult to generalize about the importance of each item because, while only a handful of legislators talked about strategic planning, for example, one legislator spent virtually the entire interview emphasizing its importance and implementation. Conversely, a majority of legislators mentioned efficiency in one way or another, but no one legislator spent much time on the topic. Finally, some of the items on the tables may have appeared in multiple interviews because the survey specifically asked about it, because the legislators thought that item was important, or because of a combination of the two.

Table 1 contains two groups of words and phrases from the legislative transcripts that define elements of the public interest. Group 1 refers to factors, such as access, related to the functions higher education performs and public interest issues. Group 2 lists structural and environmental factors in which the trustees must operate, not only the formal governance organization but also the interplay among higher education's various stakeholders as they make decisions and influence outcomes (Senge, 1990, pp. 44-47).

Many of the factors in Group 1 are directly related to the forces in Group 2. In one state, for example, the respondent said the very structure of the coordinating and governance boards (Group 2) encourages legislators to [End Page 251] communicate with board members and discourages them from direct communication with higher education administrators (Group 1). Another state senator said that the issues of access and affordability (Group 1) have long been a part of the state's higher education traditions (Group 2). [End Page 252]

The final step of the matrix analysis was to construct two separate tables, one for Group 1 and one for Group 2, placing the various factors along the two dimensions: one describing the historical, political, economic, and social/demographic aspect of the factors, the other describing whether the variable is controllable, transactional, or contextual. (See Tables 2 and 3.) The perspective I used in classifying these variables was that of the legislator, since obviously a higher education trustee may disagree with a legislator about what is in his or her control.

Tables2 and 3 give a systemic view of the words and phrases that legislators used when referring to some aspect of the public interest. Many of the states in this study are grappling with similar issues (e.g., concern about the selection process being too political), but the importance or weight attached to each factor in the tables varies by state. Ragin (1990) also emphasizes that it is the interaction of many variables and their intersection at different times that produce a given result, a phenomenon he refers to as multiple [End Page 253] [Begin Page 255] conjunctural causation. Furthermore, assigning weights is a difficult task since each variable may be impacted by several of the elements that describe the dimensions of the tables. For these reasons, some items appear in more than one quadrant, and the separate quadrants in the tables should be considered a clarifying device for the reader's convenience rather than a firm thematic assignment.

Tables 2 and 3 serve as a general framework to provide a systemic view of various elements that define the public interest. States not interviewed for this study may well have other variables that belong in the tables; but in all likelihood, additional variables can probably be placed somewhere along the given dimensions.

Enhancing Lay Governance to Meet the Public Interest

The "Big Picture"

Information from the matrices reveals legislators' belief that the single most important factor in enhancing lay governance is broader conceptualization on the part of the trustees. Hence, the greatest difficulty in meeting the public interest by finding an optimal balance between the trustee's roles as advocate and guardian lies in the legislators' perception that trustees often do not see the "big picture." Eighty-eight percent of the study respondents specifically mentioned areas in which trustees need to consider how to go beyond individual institutions: (a) how the institution fits into the state's total system of higher education, (b) how the board works with K-12 to promote the increasingly popular concept of "seamless" education, and (c) how the board views its role in helping to address larger social problems or state needs.

In reference to the first theme--how an individual institution or system fits into the state's total system of higher education--32% of the respondents said that higher education institutions must work together to see how each institution contributes to local, state, and even national and international needs. The idea that strong individual institutions do not necessarily equate to a strong statewide system of higher education is embodied in one legislator's comment: "Higher education skills are needed to advance the economy. Higher education needs to get together to do this; they need to function together, not in parts." Other legislators spoke of "partnering," "cooperation," and "coordination." Several felt that formal state-level coordination is desirable in the governance structure, helping to eliminate duplication and alleviate turf issues. One representative from a state that has recently implemented state-level coordination said that individual campuses were skeptical at first but now concede that coordination can be good. [End Page 255]

The second aspect of desired "big picture" thinking is captured in the maxim that education should be a "seamless" process from kindergarten to graduate school. A state senator said that even the governor was talking about a "seamless transition" from kindergarten to college. One senator emphasized that these linkages must exist; otherwise higher education may produce the wrong outputs. As an example, she pointed out that her state produces too many elementary school teachers and not enough science and math teachers; but if higher education and K-12 partnered better, they could see more clearly what is needed in teacher education. Another representative said that her state encourages trustees and administrators to talk to the public schools but that such communication eventually happened when the state passed legislation tying aspects of higher education's funding to how their strategic planning incorporated the K-12 system.

The third aspect of "big picture" thinking is how the board views its role in helping to address larger social problems or state needs. Higher education, according to 52% of those interviewed, needs to become more involved in statewide issues. The academy has become a very complex operation, and policy and operational decisions require a big picture perspective for steering a "multi-billion dollar business," as one senator described it. Maintaining a non-parochial view of higher education's place in the state requires a focus on things that matter. This senator continued, "I recall I was at a campus and there was some concern about the planting of flowers on this particular campus--and I thought that was probably a waste of time. That was probably not a big picture person. My most frequent criticism about college presidents--and it probably could be the same for board members--is that I want them to know more about what's going on off-campus."

Several states currently provide some sort of orientation to acclimatize board members to the complex environment in which they will be serving. Several respondents from states without orientation sessions agreed that a retreat or orientation would give trustees an overview of state needs and help strengthen citizen oversight.

As shown in Table 2, state needs ranged from job training and workforce development to addressing social problems such as welfare and crime. As one representative convincingly argued, "Governing boards should be involved in the welfare debate. The thing they are promoting, the thing they are providing, is part of the solution to welfare reform. Without higher education playing a part, can welfare really be reformed?"

Legislative Perceptions of Board Responsibilities

By design, the survey instrument was mostly qualitative in nature, but we specifically asked legislators to rate the importance they attached to nine [End Page 256] areas of responsibility generally affiliated with governance. For descriptive purposes, respondents were categorized into four groups according to patterns of campus governance (McGuiness, Epper, & Arrendondo, 1994):

1. Mixed: single institutional boards and multicampus or segmental systems

2. Consolidated: one board for all public institutions. We also included consolidated states with a separate board for community colleges.

3. Multicampus: separate boards covering separate types of campuses

4. Single: single boards for each institution

Initially, we ran a chi-square significance test to determine whether there were statistically significant differences in how respondents answered the questions. The next step of the design was to run multiple comparison tests to determine exactly where those differences existed. However, several legislators chose not to rate certain questions; others did not rate any of the questions. This, coupled with the original sample size of 25 and a rating ranging from 1 to 5, invalidated the efficacy of the chi-square test. We then looked at the contingency table that the Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) used to calculate the chi-square test for clues and information regarding which questions were deemed most important. We also looked at simple descriptive statistics, by group, to see if we could find similarities in how legislators from different states rated the areas of responsibility. Table 4 is a copy of the contingency table generated from SAS. The table gives the frequency and percentage distribution of ratings per question for all respondents, with the first column containing an abbreviated description of trustee responsibilities that we asked the legislators to rank.

Several interesting observations can be made from the contingency table. A majority of legislators rated four of the nine questions as very important (= 5). For example, the largest number of respondents rated the traditional responsibility of evaluating the president's performance as "very important" (item d).

The second highest rating of "very important" (63.6%) was trustees' responsibility to understand and oversee institutional budgets, including setting tuition and fees. How legislators rated this responsibility was consistent with their responses when we asked them about attributes they look for in trustees. For example, legislators talked about the growing need for trustees to understand financing, to understand a balance sheet, and to be stronger stewards of public resources. Many specifically mentioned budgeting and financing when they spoke of the increasing complexity of state and higher education issues that trustees face.

A majority of legislators in this survey expressed some concern that the trustees' political interests outweighed state or institutional interests. Legislators described those whom they viewed as too political as "parochial" or [End Page 257] [Begin Page 259] "single issue" trustees. Almost 62% of respondents said that creating a positive board culture, one which would enable it to act on key issues despite political or personal differences, was very important.

Finally, 59.9% of the legislators said it was very important to hold campuses accountable and assess performance against their roles and missions. Throughout the entire survey, respondents spoke of mission, goals, and accountability in the same sentence. Although the majority of legislators thought the board should somehow be involved in accountability and assessment, state lawmakers indicated that in this area and others, presidential and board responsibilities needed to be delineated. One representative, for example, said that the board should oversee accountability and assessment issues but that the ultimate responsibility for them rested with the president.

Governance Structure and Board Responsibilities

Table 5 displays the means and standard deviations by group for the nine areas of responsibility. We paid particular attention to the four responsibilities, noted in Table 4, that a majority of respondents rated "very important." (See Table 5.)

Legislators in states with mixed and single governance structures placed more importance on holding campuses accountable and creating a positive board culture among members than respondents in other states. Mixed and single governance state legislators were more inclined to say that communication with trustees was minimal or nonexistent (question c), perhaps contributing to why they felt that accountability was an important issue. Mixed and single governance states generally allowed more autonomy to their institutions of higher education than consolidated and multicampus states.

Responses varied by group about how important it was for the board to oversee institutional budgets. The single governance states rated this question lowest of the four groups, saying that budget responsibility usually fell on the administration rather than the board. Finally, all the groups believed it was important to evaluate the president.

The Players and the Structure

As the legislators made clear in their interviews, they believe that safeguarding the public interest requires collaboration. The most frequently mentioned players were the legislature and the governor, the governing board(s), the coordinating body (if one existed), the administration, and the citizenry of the state. It also was clear that a majority of legislators believed that structure can have an impact on how well the higher education system performs. But what structures make the most difference, if any? What are the responsibilities of the players? [End Page 259]

Although there is no clear preference for a centralized or decentralized higher education governance structure, a number of legislators made positive associations with some sort of centralization. One senator commented that the state had had implemented a statewide system, thus eliminating much competition among institutions; several other respondents made similar statements. A representative from another state complained that "turf issues" were permeating her state's system now that they had decentralized. "In our inferior judgement we went with two boards," she summed up. To be sure, a few legislators questioned any strategy of reorganization. One legislator expressed his lack of faith in any particular organization by commenting: "We think we can solve problems by changing structures, but it is how people are performing in the structure that is the problem."

Legislators talked about their role in terms of exercising greater scrutiny during the approval phase of appointing trustees. Some respondents called the appointment process a farce because the governor's recommendations [End Page 260] would never be rejected. Others, however, believed that the process could be strengthened by emphasizing those qualities that a trustee needs to steer higher education into the future. A number of lawmakers also felt that meeting the public interest required the involvement of citizens as much as any other major stakeholder. Respondents believed that an informed citizenry was a dual responsibility between those who run the higher education systems and the citizenry itself. Survey results suggest that higher education has a role in disseminating information to the public (Table 2) and being more visible; and individual citizens have a responsibility to become involved, be it by way of citizen committees, telephone calls to the legislature, or simply through an awareness of issues affecting higher education.

Our sample states varied in governance structure, and some legislators were satisfied with a given structure, while others were dissatisfied with a similar structure in their state. The idea that no single model of higher education governance best suits all state higher agencies (Millet, 1984) certainly is applicable to this study. Berdahl's (1971) conclusion that a state must weigh the costs and benefits of the various educational structural options because consolidated governance structures, coordinating boards, or anything inbetween will depend on the state also seemed to be a mainstay idea.

Although legislators may not have known exactly which governance structure would best serve their state, they had views on who should be doing what. It is no surprise, certainly, that lawmakers felt boards should develop policy and oversee the administration. Most respondents used terms like "management" and "operational" decision making, when describing administrative responsibility. In contrast, the state, whether acting through a formalized coordinating body or the legislature itself, should be concerned with issues of accountability, duplication, and higher education's operation from a state perspective.

Interestingly, the legislative ideas regarding the players and who should be doing what somewhat resemble one of Handy's (1995) principles of federalism: management, governance, and monitoring should reside in separate bodies. Further research along this line could perhaps make a stronger linkage between administrative, governance, and state responsibilities and the functions of management, governance, and monitoring.

Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to understand legislative expectations of higher education governing boards, disseminate the results, and draw a clearer definition of the term "public interest" from additional analysis of the data. Although the sample of legislators interviewed was purposefully small, this study sought out policy makers who were deemed knowledgeable and thoughtful about higher education. [End Page 261]

Study respondents indicated that the public interest is largely met by having a board that understands the big picture. The big picture encompasses three realms: an ability to view the state and its needs systemically, an ability to view the higher education system systemically, and an ability to view the entire spectrum of education systemically.

From a legislative perspective, the board's top responsibilities range from the traditional duty of evaluating the president to the increasingly important idea of being a capable steward of public resources. Understanding the financial aspects of higher education demands that trustees not micromanage their administrators but rather that they remind administrators of relevant policy issues associated with specific financial actions.

A key factor in meeting the public interest is how the board balances its dual role of institutional advocate versus guardian of the public trust. More respondents perceived that boards were better at advocacy than guardianship or balancing the two roles. Legislators' interpretations vary about why individual trustees may have trouble balancing these two roles. One representative saw the trustees tending to become mostly an advocate for the institution: "Part of it is because they are appointed for a certain role, but they soon become great friends with the school." Several respondents acknowledged that trustees are often pulled in different directions, but 32% of those interviewed said that their boards were doing a good job of balancing the two roles.

Finally, Tables 2 and 3 provide interesting observations about the public interest. The public interest factors plotted in Table 2 tend to cluster more toward the controllable or transactional dimension of the institution's environment. Legislators perceived that these public interest factors were largely controllable by the administration or the board, and they seemed to associate these factors with the institution. For example, improving operational efficiency was something legislators perceived as being within the institution's control.

The structural public interest factors in Table 3 cluster toward the contextual part of higher education's environment. Interview results indicated that most of these factors were related to higher education but did not fall under the direct control of either the board or the administration. Existing social problems, for example, require higher education to be part of the solution, but not the sole solution. In addition, factors such as existing governance structures and changing business needs are not easily changed or easily anticipated. Legislators were more inclined to mention state, board, administrative, and citizen involvement, and cooperation when addressing the structural public interest factors.

All of the factors in Table 2 are in some way linked to the concept of serving the public interest, yet it is difficult to conclude which factors relate to advocacy, public guardianship, or both. Although the results of this survey [End Page 262] make it tempting to conclude that certain players have control over certain factors, a survey of a different audience may lead to different results. From a legislative perspective, the board's success in meeting the public interest lies largely in balancing the dual roles of advocacy and guardianship. Perhaps the first order of business is to identify which factors are of most concern in a particular state and then to figure out who is in the best position to affect them.

Mario C. Martinez is currently an Assistant Professor in the College of Education at New Mexico State University. He is coauthor of three chapters in the recently published Public and Private Financing of Higher Education: Shaping Public Policy for the Future (Phoeniz, AZ: ACE/Oryx Press, 1997). He presented a version of this article at the Association for the Study of Higher Education 1997 annual meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He thanks Sandra Ruppert, Educational Systems Research, for allowing his participation in conducting the survey, permitting subsequent analysis, and offering input on this article, Mary Beth Worley, New Mexico State University, for running the statistical calculations, and Stanley Barrett, New Mexico State University, for helping code the interview notes and tally results. Address inquiries to Mario C. Martinez, Assistant Professor, New Mexico State University, EMD, MS 3N, P.O. Box 300001, Las Cruces, NM 88003-8001; telephone: (505) 646-6021; e-mail: mamario@nmsu.edu.

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