Restructuring State Higher Education Governance Patterns

Laurence R. Marcus

Tables

Introduction

For the better part of half a century, states have sought to provide for a rational system of higher education through the mechanism of state-level and institutional boards, each uniquely empowered to be responsive to the issues and concerns in their state at the time that the governance pattern was adopted. However, as issues and concerns have changed, so has the formal relationship between the state-level entity and the colleges and universities. There have been shifts between governing and coordinating structures and between centralization and decentralization in both structural forms. State-level and institutional boards have been created, combined, replaced, and dissolved, as states have sought to improve governance. As noted by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1976), the relationship between states and their higher education institutions has been dynamic and complex. [End Page 399]

This article seeks to shed light on whether there is any combination of factors that may predict the enactment of proposals for the restructuring of their relationships. More specifically, it investigates a set of internal factors to discern the extent to which they drive change in governance patterns. Further, I focus on the proposals for the most extensive governance restructuring to determine the extent to which regional effects may promote the enactment of similarly directed initiatives among nearby states. The article begins with a historical overview of the changing relationship between states and their institutions of higher learning. The findings are based on the results of a study regarding governance reform activity initiated in the five-year period from 1989 to 1994.

Historical Overview

To accommodate the demand for higher education created by the G.I. Bill and the post-World War II baby boom, states dramatically expanded their systems of public higher education. State-level higher education boards and agencies proliferated to manage this growth, driven by the need to make the most efficient use of resources and to meet the public demand for access to quality programs of study. By 1972, 47 states had higher education boards, also called commissions or councils. Some of these boards had statutory responsibility to govern the entire public higher education sector, while others received governing authority over four-year publics only. Some states established boards with varying degrees of authority to coordinate the activity of institutional governing boards, handling such matters as institutional licensure, statewide planning, and approval of new degree programs.

Glenny (1959), Berdahl (1971), and Millett (1984) have chronicled the rationale for their establishment, role, and effect on higher education. There was a widespread perception that existing structures (state education departments primarily interested in K-12 education or legislatures making higher education policies based either on institutional hegemony or in response to local power bases) failed to provide a rational state system. While historical factors in each of the states determined whether governing or coordinating boards were established, Hearn and Griswold (1994) have argued that the movement toward formal state-level governance arrangements was inevitable. However, as the times and the politics in a state change, so also does the conception of what constitutes the best approach to providing a rational state system of higher education. McGuinness (1994) has charted the modifications in state-level governance patterns.

During the 1970s, 12 states significantly altered their higher education structures. Increased centralization was the predominant pattern, with the most dramatic occurring in North Carolina and Wisconsin, where coordinating bodies were replaced with unitary statewide governing boards for [End Page 400] their four-year public institutions. Seven other states accorded additional authority to their coordinating boards.

In response to national concerns about quality and accountability, the pace of change increased in the second half of the 1980s; 27 states conducted major studies of the effectiveness of their higher education systems, and 14 implemented reforms, 12 in the direction of increased centralization. Existing but weak coordinating boards in Colorado, Texas, and Washington and a planning commission in Nebraska were replaced by more powerful coordinating boards. Similarly, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oregon strengthened their already strong coordinating boards. Alaska, California, Colorado, and Connecticut also strengthened coordination for their community colleges. The Dakotas increased the authority of their statewide governing boards, and Oregon heightened the role of the governor in higher education matters.

Centralization also resulted from institutional consolidations. In Texas, consolidation of system boards resulted in the University System of South Texas being merged into Texas A&M University and Pan American University being merged into the University of Texas, respectively. Maryland moved all but two four-year public institutions under the umbrella of a new University of Maryland board; a new state-level commission with strong, but narrower, authority replaced the old coordinating board led by a chief executive officer appointed by the governor.

Only two states implemented decentralization during the second half of the 1980s. New Jersey granted its nine state colleges certain fiscal, operational and personnel authority that had formerly been lodged in the state's Treasury and Civil Service Departments, simultaneously providing $35 million in Governor's Challenge grants. Thus, the legislative intent of this action was not only to empower local boards of trustees, under the coordination of the State Board of Higher Education, to take increased control over the day-to-day affairs of their campuses, but also to engage in long-range planning that would result in national distinction. West Virginia created two governing boards where only one had previously existed but also created a Secretary of Education and the Arts appointed by the governor to provide overall coordination.

In the 1990s the trend toward centralization continued, but the counter-trend of decentralization intensified slightly. Minnesota consolidated its public two-year and four-year colleges (excluding the University of Minnesota) under a new governing board. Montana merged its two-year and four-year teaching institutions into the state's two research universities. North Dakota combined the administrations of two public institutions and designated specific institutions to provide given services (such as human resource management and purchasing) for the entire system. Utah granted its Board of Regents increased authority for applied technology education. Colorado shifted the authority to appoint the state higher education executive officer [End Page 401] from the coordinating board to the governor and limited higher education funding increases to five areas designated by the legislature. Tennessee's legislature also increased its role. Continuing a trend of placing freestanding institutions into larger systems, the Texas legislature merged the Lamar University System into the Texas State University System (Mangan, 1995). Similarly, New Hampshire merged six of its seven technical colleges into three two-campus regional institutions, eliminating three presidencies and nine of 21 deans (Rivera, 1995).

However, double the number of states as in the 1980s took decentralizing steps. Connecticut authorized each institutional governing board to submit its budget request directly to the governor and the legislature, thus reducing the Board of Governors' authority. Virginia began a pilot program allowing several institutions to undertake certain operational functions that were formerly lodged in agencies of state government. South Carolina restructured its state coordinating board to include institutional representation, an action that may lead to greater institutional authority. Oregon granted its higher education system a large measure of fiscal and operational autonomy by permitting it to undertake purchasing, contracting, and personnel management outside of the state government's central apparatus. In 1995, in the face of resource constraints that required budget reductions, Hawaii's legislature permitted its university system to keep the tuition revenues it collected, rather than returning the funds to the state coffers for reappropriation (Snyder, 1995c).

During the first half of the 1990s, three states--Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Illinois--adopted both consolidation and deregulation aspects, increasing institutional autonomy and, simultaneously, concentrating more authority in the governor's office. Massachusetts merged two formerly freestanding public universities into the University of Massachusetts and granted its board significant fiscal, operational, and personnel authority over its now five campuses. The powerful statewide Board of Regents was replaced by a coordinating council that maintained certain governing responsibilities for the state and community colleges. The centralizing feature of the reorganization was the creation of a cabinet-level Secretary of Education with responsibilities for coordinating K-12 and higher education.

New Jersey's Board of Higher Education had been, by statute, one of the most powerful coordinating boards in the nation for nearly three decades. In 1994, this board and a cabinet-level department were replaced by a Commission on Higher Education with limited responsibility, a small staff, and subcabinet status. Institutional governing boards received authority to make budget requests directly to the governor, power to set tuition and fees without state oversight, and the ability to establish new degree programs within the institution's existing mission. Another decentralizing measure was the [End Page 402] establishment of a Council of Presidents to advise the Commission. However, simultaneous centralizing measures increased the governor's power over higher education: first, the governor, rather than the Board of Higher Education with the governor's consent, would appoint trustees of the state colleges and the two state-appointed members of the county college boards of trustees; second, budget requests, previously consolidated and submitted by the board, would be submitted by institutions directly to the governor, and third, the administration of student financial aid programs was transferred to the state treasurer, appointed by the governor.

An Illinois statute, passed in 1995 after several years of wrangling, had the decentralizing feature of replacing two multi-institution governing boards (representing a total of eight institutions) with individual governing boards for seven universities. (Sangamon State, previously under one of the eliminated boards, was transferred to the University of Illinois.) The statute had a centralizing effect, however, by changing the process of publicly electing the board of trustees of the University of Illinois to one of gubernatorial appointment (Snyder, 1995a). This feature is currently the subject of litigation in the state courts.

New proposals for change continue to be advanced. For example, in 1995 Connecticut's governor proposed shifting the state's 12 community and technical colleges to the control of the Connecticut State University System and eliminating the presidents of the two-year institutions (Snyder, 1995b).

The Bases for Change

As one might readily gather from this recounting, the equilibrium in authority between the state-level board and the institutional boards, as well as between institutional governing boards and their component campuses is dynamic. Indeed, since their establishment, state-level boards have not enjoyed a tranquil existence, irrespective of whether they were created to govern or to coordinate. Indeed, their "boundary" function has often made them the focus of conflict. Legislatures want them to ensure that the public interest checks the ambition of the institutions, influences institutional direction, and insulates legislators from interinstitutional bickering. At the same time, the institutions expect state boards to advocate increased funding and keep the politicians outside of the ivy-covered walls. As McGuinness (1994) points out, "In the best of times, the role is to be a constructive, mediating force between often contradictory perspectives. But in more times than not, it is to be vilified by one side or the other, occasionally ignored altogether and sometimes crushed in the middle" (p. 1). Efforts to reduce the level of noise that typically swirls around state boards have often taken the form of proposals to restructure the landscape of higher education by [End Page 403] shifting power in the direction of the state or toward the institutions, by creating or dismantling multi-institutional governing boards, etc.

In recent years, tension among higher education's principal actors has risen as the result of (a) the major economic reformation driven by advancing technology and by an increasingly global marketplace and of (b) the recurring philosophical debate that has once again taken America's center stage about the proper role of government. Although a collegiate education is, more than ever, seen as the means toward a more secure future for the individual and as a vehicle to spur economic development, higher education has benefited from no financial windfall as a result. The escalating costs of the "mandatory" aspects of state government--law, public safety, corrections, welfare, Medicaid, state employee benefits, etc.--and the rising tide of taxpayer unrest have led to policy choices that have channeled the vast new sums in the public coffers away from colleges and universities. This was true even in the mid-1980s when an economic boom and increased taxation resulted in a growth in state revenues. Instead, with higher education typically the biggest discretionary expenditure in state budgets, the enterprise suffered budget cuts. In fact, in FY92 higher education appropriations were below those of the previous year for the first time in the 40 years that such statistics have been kept; the next year, higher education appropriations increased at a lower rate than the rate of inflation in three-quarters of the states (Jones, 1993). Elected officials began to demand increased accountability; state boards began to ponder how best to measure institutional outcomes; and colleges and universities began to complain more loudly about regulatory and reporting requirements that diverted resources away from the central institutional mission and toward the goals of bureaucrats. The convergence of tensions once again brought the structure of state-level higher education governance under reformist scrutiny.

Since the rhetoric surrounding structural reorganizations typically indicates that they were intended to improve effectiveness in meeting organizational goals, to achieve efficiencies, or to improve accountability, Hearn and Griswold (1994) sought to determine the extent to which centralization of authority affects state-level higher education policy innovation. Analyzing data from the Education Commission of the States, they found less policy innovation coming from what they termed "weak coordinating boards" and other more decentralized patterns than from "strong coordinating boards" and statewide governing boards. However, they found little difference in levels of policy innovation between the latter two. They also concluded that only some types of reforms (including those in some academic areas and business operations) were positively associated with centralization, while other categories of reform (including teacher education and institutional finance) were not. Thus, those who posit that most problems will be resolved simply by replacing a consolidated governing board with a strong [End Page 404] coordinating board (or vice versa) may need to look for different solutions. Similarly, those who expect policy innovation to occur in a structure characterized by strong institutional autonomy and minimal state coordination may be equally disappointed.

There are several schools of thought about why a state adopts a new policy (Berry, 1994). One holds that a state's political, social, and economic characteristics determine whether it engages in policy innovation. Another posits that states are more likely to adopt a policy as the number of nearby states which have already adopted the policy increases. A third contends that policy adoption, particularly in education, is based more on a pattern of national interaction--that action in a given year is proportional to the number of interactions that officials of a state that has yet to adopt a policy have with officials of already adopting states. Hearn and Griswold (1994) found that the level of education of a state's population, the size of the state, and its region are positively associated with policy innovation, thus supporting Berry's (1994) hypothesis that both internal and regional factors play a role.

McGuinness (1994) focuses on internal determinants in his identification of a number of long-standing irritants that result in calls for change, particularly when the economy is weak: (a) issues about duplication in costly graduate, professional, and medical programs; (b) institutions in near proximity with conflicting or overlapping aspirations; (c) legislative dissatisfaction with the lobbying efforts of individual institutions; (d) concerns regarding barriers to transferability of credits between public institutions, particularly between the community colleges and the four-year institutions; (e) inadequate coordination of vocational programs at the two-year college level; (f) conflict arising from proposals to merge institutions or to change institutional mission; and (g) concerns that the state board is more engaged in administrative management than in policy leadership--even if the managerial activity is a statutory requirement.

The Study

Utilizing survey research, interviews, and documentary analysis, I undertook a study to identify the determinants of governance restructuring in higher education. In April 1994, I surveyed the 49 state higher education executive officers (SHEEOs) about proposals made between 1989 and 1994 to restructure higher education governance patterns. ¹ The survey asked them to identify and describe each proposal, to specify who initiated the proposal, to cite the precipitating issues, and to indicate whether the proposal had been enacted. I received replies from all but 10, eight of whom responded to follow-up requests in June 1994. I completed the data set by conducting telephone [End Page 405] interviews with officials from agencies in the two remaining states. (Many included complete copies of the respective proposals with their responses.)

The survey revealed that 49 proposals had been advanced in 29 states between 1989 and 1994 and that action had been completed on 38 proposals. I collected information about the outcome of 10 of the 11 pending proposals by a written request in April 1995 and by telephone calls in September 1995. As of fall 1995, 27 of the 49 proposals (55%) were enacted in 20 states; 21 were not enacted; and one proposal in Rhode Island had passed one house of the legislature in the spring of 1995 but appeared to be stalled in the other house.

Who Initiated the Restructuring Proposals?

As displayed in Table 1, legislators initiated most (25) of the restructuring proposals; 48% of these were enacted. Governors or their study groups generated nine proposals, two-thirds of which were approved. Ten proposals came from state-level higher education authorities in eight states. Proposals from this group had the highest enactment rate (80%). Among these ten proposals, three came from governing boards (all were enacted), while seven came from five coordinating boards (one board's proposal was not enacted; a second board had only one of two proposals enacted). Proposals also came from other sources: one was jointly advanced by the governor, legislature, and state-level governing board; two were jointly proposed by the governor and legislators; one was advanced by a business advisory council on behalf of the state's public institutions; and one was proposed by the state comptroller. Only the first succeeded.

Why Were the Restructuring Proposals Advanced?

Six rationales, solely or in various combinations, underpinned the 49 proposals. (See Table 2). The most frequently cited rationale was the desire [End Page 406] to reduce or contain costs, a motive integral to 55% of the proposals, 63% of which were enacted. Fourteen of the 27 proposals with cost-conscious rationales specifically sought to reduce program duplication across the state.

The second most frequently cited reason for restructuring proposals was the desire to increase accountability; it was the goal of 51% of the proposals (68% of which were enacted). This category includes efforts to increase productivity at the institutions, a factor in 15 of the 25 accountability-related proposals. Also included in accountability were two concerns often mentioned in the higher education literature--the desire to improve institutional outcomes (in nine proposals) and public dissatisfaction with higher education (in six proposals).

Interestingly, the centralization/decentralization battle, waged ever since state-level higher education boards were first created, rated a draw during this five-year period, with 45% of the proposals seeking to improve coordination and an equal number seeking to enhance institutional autonomy; half of each were enacted. Perhaps surprising, given the current national political debate, is the fact that general governmental deregulation underlay only four of the 22 autonomy-related proposals. [End Page 407]

Power also played a role in the restructuring efforts. The trend toward increased interest in higher education on the part of elected officials was evidenced by the fact that 22% of the proposals sought to increase the authority of the governor and/or legislature over higher education; 64% were enacted. Power struggles between institutions and the state board, among institutions, or between the state board and other governmental entities were involved in 18% of the proposals, 56% of which were enacted.

Which Internal Factors Are Associated with Enactment?

I made a statistical analysis of the data to determine the extent to which these factors may be associated with successful attempts to enact proposals about restructuring state-level higher education. I included only the 48 proposals that were either enacted or defeated. (I did not include the Rhode Island proposal since no final action had been taken when I analyzed the data.)

With a bivariate analysis, I sought to determine the association between whether the proposal was enacted (the dependent variable) and each of the following independent variables: who initiated the proposal, the desire to reduce/contain costs, the desire to improve accountability, the desire to improve coordination, the desire to enhance autonomy, the desire to increase gubernatorial or legislative authority over higher education, whether there was a power struggle in the state's higher education community, and the existence of a rationale or driving force other than these factors. Only one factor--who initiated the proposal--appears to be correlated with enactment (X ² = 5.32, significance = .02). Proposals initiated by the state-level board were extremely successful, while those initiated by multiple sources or by some fourth party were not; proposals initiated by governors or legislators fell in between. None of the other factors came even close to having a significant relationship (.05 level) with enactment.

Similarly, I performed a multivariate logistic regression analysis, using enactment as the dependent variable and each of the aforementioned initiating and rationale factors as independent variables. Here, too, the variability seems to be best accounted for by the initiator of the proposal (B = 1.01, significance = .02). (The resolution of the pending proposal in Rhode Island would not alter the bivariate or multivariate findings appreciably; with either a positive or negative outcome for that proposal, the only significant factor would still be the initiator of the proposal.)

Finally, I ran correlation coefficients to determine whether there was any significant relationship between any pair of variables. Beyond the relationship between the enactment of a proposal and its initiator (p = .019), only two other variables appeared to be significantly related: the existence of a power struggle and the effort to increase the power of the governor and/or legislature over higher education (p = .022). [End Page 408]

Regional Factors in Major Restructuring Proposals

Twenty-three of the 49 proposals involved sweeping changes to the state's higher education system of governance; 12 were enacted. As displayed in Table 2, the rationales for major proposals were arrayed in the same order as those for all proposals. There were, however, some differences in proportion, two of which were particularly notable: 65% of major proposals sought to reduce or contain costs (compared to 55% of all proposals), while only 13% tried to increase the authority of the governor and/or legislature (compared to 22% of all proposals).

A statistical analysis of the major proposals is not particularly useful, given their small numbers. However, at least one theme emerges from an examination of the twelve states that enacted the most sweeping changes. Consistent with the previous research about policy innovation, regional factors were apparently influential. For example, West Virginia's gubernatorially initiated move away from strong centralization toward increased institutional autonomy followed the example of bordering Virginia. In the northeast, two of the three states that enacted major restructuring (Massachusetts and New Jersey) behaved similarly during this period, replacing strong state-level boards and enhancing institutional autonomy, but balancing the decentralization with an increased role for the governor. Power struggles were reportedly a factor in those two northeastern states, with the institutional desire for increased autonomy prevailing. Both proposals came from governors. A Connecticut action, not of major proportions, was in a similar autonomy-enhancing vein as the Massachusetts and New Jersey reforms: The authority of the state board was somewhat constrained, and institutional governing boards were authorized to submit their budget requests directly to the governor and the legislature. However, Connecticut's major restructuring was in the direction of centralization: mergers within the community and technical college system reduced the number of institutions from 17 to 12 and provided for increased coordination across the community college system. (Since the period under study, New Hampshire has enacted an institutional consolidation measure modeled after Connecticut's.)

Among the mid-America states that effected major restructuring, only Illinois fit the predominant decentralization pattern of the states to the east, perhaps because the proposal came from a like-minded governor and also involved a power struggle. The other five states in this region (Arkansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, and North Dakota) focused on increasing accountability by significantly centralizing authority. Three of these proposals came from state boards, while two came from the legislature. None of the proposals among this group reportedly involved power struggles.

The two western states which enacted major restructuring measures shared the same goal of seeking to cut costs and to achieve operating efficiencies [End Page 409] without negatively impacting program delivery. However, although driven by the same rationale, they took divergent paths toward its accomplishment. Alaska did it by centralizing authority (though not at the state level)--merging 11 community colleges and three universities into three multi-campus systems. Oregon granted the higher education system increased autonomy to manage most day-to-day operations separately from the traditional state government apparatus, thereby encouraging more efficient business practices. Both proposals came from the state boards.

Conclusions

How states structure the coordination and delivery of higher education is under continuing scrutiny. This study examined 49 proposals initiated in 29 states between 1989 and 1994. Their enactment rate was impressive: 27 proposals (55%) in 20 states. Legislators were the most frequent source of proposals, but those of state boards were most likely to be enacted. As a sign of our times, more than half of the proposals were intended to reduce or contain costs (a factor that was also the driving force for the establishment of most state-level boards and agencies decades earlier). The desire to increase institutional accountability (a more recent phenomenon) was also a factor in more than half of the cases. Proposals that contained either of these two rationales passed at higher than average rates (63% and 68%, respectively). There was no clear trend in the centralization/decentralization polemic: proposals to improve statewide coordination and to enhance institutional autonomy appeared the same number of times and were both adopted in half of the instances (slightly under the average enactment rate). However, when I looked separately at successful major restructuring initiatives, the results were consistent with earlier studies; they showed regional patterns in which, more often than not, a state adopted a centralizing or decentralizing governance reform similar to that of a neighbor.

Finally, the correlation between the existence of a power struggle and the effort to increase the role of the governor and legislature in higher education apparently confirms the observation that if the institutions and the state-level board are battling with each other or if the state-level board is not able to mediate power struggles occurring among institutions, then elected officials may seek to restore order by taking a strong hand themselves. All three of the cases when governors initiated actions during a power struggle resulted in the passage of major restructuring measures, while two of the five measures initiated by legislators were adopted. Perhaps more important in the long run, the correlation may result in a narrowing of the arm's-length distance between elected officials and higher education. Such efforts occurring between 1989 and 1994 had a high rate of success: five of eight proposals [End Page 410] to increase the governor's role were adopted, as were three of four about the legislature's role. One message to state-level higher education leaders and college and university presidents alike seems clear: If they believe that the interests of higher education are best served when the intended barrier between higher education and politics is only infrequently breached, then focusing on the cooperative implementation of a shared vision of higher education excellence is more fruitful than jockeying for power and control.

Laurence R. Marcus is a Professor in the Educational Leadership Department at Rowan College, where he teaches courses in leadership theory, educational policy, and planning. He was formerly a state-level administrator, having served until 1994 as the New Jersey Department of Higher Education's assistant chancellor for academic and fiscal affairs. His most recent book, Fighting Words: The Politics of Hateful Speech, was published by Praeger in 1996.

Note

1. The survey does not include the post-1994 restructuring proposals cited in this article.

References

Berdahl, R. O. (1971). Statewide coordination of higher education. Washington, DC: American Council on Education.

Berry, F. S. (1994, Autumn). "Sizing up state policy innovation research." Policy Studies Journal, 22, 442-456.

Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. (1976). The states and higher education: A proud past and a vital future. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Glenny, L. A. (1959). Autonomy of public colleges: The challenges of coordination. New York: McGraw Hill.

Hearn, J. C., & Griswold, C. P. (1994, Summer). State-level centralization and policy innovation in U.S. postsecondary education. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 16, 161-190.

Jones, D. (1993, July 3.) In brief, educational policy studies: Issues in higher education finance. Washington, DC: National Governors' Association.

Mangan, K. S. (1995, June 2). The Texas legislature voted last week to end the freestanding status of the Lamar University system, which has endured political infighting and charges of mismanagement. Chronicle of Higher Education, A27.

McGuinness, A. C., Jr. (1994). The changing structure of state higher education leadership. In A. C. McGuinness, Jr., R. M. Epper, & S. Arredondo, State Postsecondary Education Structures Handbook, 1994 (pp. 1-45). Denver, CO: Education Commission of the States.

McGuinness, A. C., Jr., R. M. Epper, & S. Arredondo. (1994). State Postsecondary Education Structures Handbook 1994. Denver, CO: Education Commission of the States.

Millett, J. D. (1984). Conflict in higher education: State coordination versus institutional independence. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Rivera, D. (1995, 23 June). New Hampshire Gov. Stephen Merrill, a Republican, has signed legislation to merge campuses and reduce administrative costs in the state's technical-college system. Chronicle of Higher Education, A26.

Snyder, J. (1995a, March 3). Illinois Legislature approves bill to decentralize 7 public campuses. Chronicle of Higher Education, A24.

Snyder, J. (1995b, March 17). The governor of Connecticut has proposed eliminating the positions of 12 community and technical college presidents and placing their institutions under the control of the Connecticut State University System. Chronicle of Higher Education, A30.

Snyder, J. (1995c, May 12). The Hawaii legislature passed a bill last week that would give the University of Hawaii system direct control over the money it brings in. Chronicle of Higher Education, A30.

Appendix

Proposals for State-level Higher Education Restructuring

1989-1994 ¹

1. Alabama. Proposed by legislature, 1992-1994. Proposal: Change governance of community colleges by removing them from the state education department and merging them under university board. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; reduce program duplication; provide better coordination; public dissatisfaction with higher education system. Not enacted.

2. Alaska. Proposed by Board of Regents, 1989. Proposal: Merge 11 community colleges and three universities into three multi-campus institutions; realign statewide programs. Issues: Desire to reduce expenditures by cutting system costs without significant impact on program delivery. Enacted.

3. Arizona. (1) Proposed by legislature and governor, 1992-1993. Proposal: Create three boards in place of one existing board. Issues: Increase institutional autonomy. Enacted. (2) Proposed by legislature and governor, 1994. Proposal: Add members to the Board of Regents to change geographic representation. Issue: Battle between legislators from two regions of the state. Not enacted.

4. Arkansas. Proposed by Board of Higher Education, 1991. Proposal: Create a new two-year system to include 14 former vocational-tech schools that were upgraded to technical colleges. Issue: Business dissatisfaction with higher education system. Enacted.

5. California. (1) Proposed by Postsecondary Education Commission, 1989. Proposal: Create an independent council to oversee and regulate private institutions (other than those that are nonprofit and regionally accredited). Issue: Consumer protection. Enacted. (2) Proposed by Postsecondary Education Commission, 1993. Proposal: Decentralize the state's student financial aid program to the institutional level. Issues: Increase institutional autonomy; cost reduction. Not enacted. (3) Proposed by legislature, 1994. Proposal: Increase institutional accountability, coordinate workforce preparation programs with the workplace. Issues: Increase accountability; provide better coordination; improve institutional outcomes; increase productivity; reduce expenditures. Not enacted.

6. Colorado. (1) Proposed by the legislature. Proposal: Replace Coordinating Commission and six institutional governing boards with a single statewide governing board. Issues: Provide better coordination; public dissatisfaction with higher education system; desire to increase governor's role in higher education. Not enacted. (2) Proposed by the legislature, 1993. Proposal: Make governor (rather than the Coordinating Council) the appointing authority for the Coordinating Commission's executive director. Issues: Increase accountability; desire to increase governor's role in higher education. Enacted. (3) Proposed by the legislature, 1993. Proposal: Limit higher education funding increases to five areas to be approved by the legislature. Issues: Increase accountability; improve productivity; desire to increase legislature's role in higher education funding. Enacted.

7. Connecticut. (1) Proposed by the legislature during 1989-1994 period but exact date not reported. Proposal: Centralize campus administrations and merge institutions. Issues: Increase accountability; reduce program duplication; provide better coordination; improve productivity. Not enacted. (2) Proposed by the legislature some time during 1989-1994. Proposal: Reorganize community and technical college systems and merge institutions (reducing 17 to 12). Issues: Reduce program duplication; provide better coordination; improve productivity. Enacted. (3) Proposed by the legislature, 1993. Proposal: Decentralize the administration of the State University System to the institutional level, abolishing the central office. Issues: Enhance institutional autonomy; reduce expenditures; battle between a legislator and the university president. (4) Proposed by the legislature some time during 1989-1994. Proposal: Provide institutional governing boards with increased fiscal flexibility and the ability to submit budgets directly to the governor and legislature; statewide Board of Governors retains authority to make institutional budget recommendations. Issues: Enhance institutional autonomy. Enacted.

8. Hawaii. Proposed by legislature, 1992-1993. Proposal: Separate Hilo campus from University of Hawaii system. Issue: Enhance institutional autonomy. Not enacted.

9. Illinois. Proposed by governor and lieutenant governor, 1993. Proposals: Replace two boards governing eight campuses with a board for each campus; transfer a campus to the University of Illinois system; replace elected trustees with gubernatorially appointed trustees. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; desire to improve institutional outcomes; effort to improve productivity; effort to reduce expenditures; desire to enhance institutional autonomy; part of general governmental deregulation; power struggle between central office and campuses; increase role of governor. Enacted.

10. Kansas. Proposed by legislature, 1994. Proposal: Merge Washburn University, a municipally sponsored institution, into the Kansas Board of Regents system; remove the community colleges from the state Board of Education and place them under the Board of Regents; leave vocational schools under the Board of Education, but require those that would offer an associate's degree to become a part of a regents institution. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; desire to reduce program duplication; provide for better coordination; effort to improve productivity; desire to enhance institutional autonomy. Not enacted.

11. Kentucky. (1) Proposed by governor, 1993. Proposal: Establish a Higher Education Review Commission to review the functioning of the state's higher education system in light of constrained resources. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; desire to reduce program duplication; provide for better coordination; desire to improve institutional outcomes; effort to improve productivity. Enacted. (2) Proposed by Governor's Higher Education Review Commission, 1993. Proposals: Establish a commission to study the governance, organization, and delivery of postsecondary technical education; recommend performance-based funding model for higher education. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; desire to reduce program duplication; provide for better coordination; desire to improve institutional outcomes; effort to reduce expenditures. Enacted.

12. Louisiana. Proposed by governor, 1989-1991. Proposal: Consolidate three institutional boards and the statewide coordinating board into one statewide governing board. Issues: Increase efficiency; provide for better coordination; desegregate higher education boards. Not enacted.

13. Maine. Proposed by legislature, 1993. Proposal: Eliminate the Chancellor's Office, decentralizing authority to the institutional level. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; effort to improve productivity; enhance institutional autonomy; public dissatisfaction with the higher education system; desire to increase legislature's role in higher education. Not enacted.

14. Massachusetts. ² Proposed by governor, 1991. Proposal: Replace the Board of Regents, a statewide governing board, with a Higher Education Coordinating Council that has some governing responsibilities for the state and community colleges; delegate significant authority to institutional governing boards; consolidate two previously separate public universities into the University of Massachusetts system; create a cabinet-level Secretary of Education to coordinate all education policy, including higher education. Issues: Part of general government deregulation; enhance institutional autonomy; effort to reduce expenditures; desire to increase governor's role in higher education; power struggle between central agency and University of Massachusetts. Enacted.

15. Minnesota. (1) Proposed by legislature, 1991. Proposal: Effective July 1, 1995, merge all public institutions except the University of Minnesota system into a new system; replace three governing boards with one new one. Issues: Provide for better coordination; reduce program duplication; increase accountability; create long-run efficiencies; ensure future access in the face of limited resources. Enacted. (2) Proposed by legislature, 1992-1993. Proposal: Repeal 1991 action and give Higher Education Coordinating Board more authority. Issue: Maintain governance status quo. Not enacted. (3) Proposed by governor, 1993. Proposal: Reorganize all agencies that deal with children and young people into the Department of Education. Issues: Provide for better coordination. Not enacted. (4) Proposed by legislature, 1994. Proposal: Abolish the Higher Education Coordinating Board as of June 30, 1995. Issues: In spirit of 1991 action; reduce expenditures. Enacted.

16. Montana. Proposed by Board of Regents, 1994. Proposal: Administratively merged two four-year colleges with The University of Montana; administratively merged the other two four-year colleges with Montana State University; "administrative merger" means that the institutions share a president and administrative personnel but maintain the integrity of their purposes and support functions; each campus has a chancellor who may function as chief academic officer. Merged three two-year colleges of technology with The University of Montana; merged the other two two-year colleges of technology with Montana State University; "merger" means the fusion or absorption of one institution into another with the result that the merged institution ceases to have an independent existence. Issues: Provide for better coordination; reduce program duplication; provide for better transferability; improve fiscal management and enrollment management. For the two-year colleges, mission drift, funding inequities, and responsiveness to business and industry. Enacted.

17. Nebraska. Proposed by governor, 1990. Proposal: Create a statewide Coordinating Commission for Postsecondary Education with responsibility to review and approve/disapprove new and existing programs and capital expenditures, and with authority to review institutional budgets and make recommendations to the legislature. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; desire to reduce program duplication; provide for better coordination. Enacted.

18. New Jersey. Proposed by governor, 1994. Proposal: Replace Board of Higher Education and cabinet-level Department of Higher Education with a Commission on Higher Education having limited range of responsibility, a small staff, and without cabinet-level status; create a Council of Presidents to advise the commission; delegate significant authority to institutions including the ability to submit budget requests directly to the governor, to set tuition and fees without state-level approval, and to establish new degree programs within the approved institutional mission; transfer operation of student financial aid programs to Department of Treasury. Issues: Part of general government deregulation; enhance institutional autonomy; effort to reduce expenditures; power struggle between senior public institutions and central office; desire to increase governor's and treasurer's role in higher education. Enacted.

19. North Dakota. Proposed by Board of Higher Education, 1990. Proposal: Created the North Dakota University System with a chancellor to whom all senior college and university presidents report; the central office focuses on planning and policy; operations are decentralized at the campus level; institutional budgets are individually submitted by the Board of Higher Education as required by constitution. Issues: Provide for better coordination; reduce program duplication. Enacted.

20. Oklahoma. (1) Proposed by legislature, 1992. Proposal: Study the governance of higher education. Issues: to achieve academic excellence and efficiency resulting in decentralization. Enacted. (2) Proposed by State Regents for Higher Education, 1993. Proposal: Delegate greater authority to institutional boards; transfer Cameron University from University of Oklahoma Board of Regents to the Board of Regents of Oklahoma Colleges; establish new governance arrangements for several campuses under the Oklahoma State University board (A&M Board), including establishment of separate boards for some and new affiliations for others; merge several two-year institutions in the Oklahoma City area; commission a study of the advantages and disadvantages of a single coordinated medical education system. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; reduce program duplication; provide for better coordination; desire to improve institutional outcomes; effort to improve productivity; effort to reduce expenditures; enhance institutional autonomy; part of general government deregulation. Not enacted.

21. Oregon. Proposed by State System of Higher Education, 1994. Proposal: Convert the State System of Higher Education from traditional state agency status to a public corporation with authority to manage day-to-day operations separately from state government. Issues: In the face of dramatic reductions in state support, empower the State System to implement efficient business practices and streamline operations, also to become more responsive, innovative, and entrepreneurial. Enacted. ³

22. Rhode Island. Proposed by legislature, 1994. Proposal: Permit public institutions a greater measure of flexibility in purchasing and personnel decisions. Issue: Enhance institutional autonomy. Action pending at completion of the study.

23. South Carolina. Four competing bills considered simultaneously in 1994. (1) Proposed by legislature. Proposal: Increase the institutional authority by reconstituting the Commission on Higher Education by reducing its membership from 18 (two from each Congressional District plus six at-large) to 10, nine of whom would be voting (one from each of the six Congressional districts, three trustees representing a public research university, a four-year or two-year public college, and a local area technical education commission; the nonvoting member would be an independent college or university president). Issues: Power struggle between the institutions and the Commission on Higher Education; institutions seeking greater autonomy; increase in accountability. Enacted. ⁴ (2) Proposed by the Business Advisory Council on Higher Education. Proposal: Replace the existing commission with a coordinating council of 10 members, nine of whom would be institutional trustees; the executive director would be appointed by the governor. Issue: Power struggle; institutions seek greater autonomy; increase role of governor. Not enacted. (3) Proposed by legislature. Proposal: Replace the commission with a stronger 12-member board of regents that would have eight gubernatorial appointees, three public college trustees, and a representative of the independent institutions. Issues: Provide better coordination, reduce program duplication; increase accountability; power struggle. Not enacted. (4) Proposed by legislature. Proposal: Require a study of governance prior to the enactment of any changes. Issue: Provide better coordination. Enacted. ⁵

24. Tennessee. Proposed by legislature, 1994. Proposal: Change the status of the nonvoting ex officio state constitutional members of the Higher Education Commission to voting members. Issues: Provide for better coordination; desire to increase legislature's role in higher education. Enacted.

25. Texas. (1) Proposed by governor, 1993. Proposal: Make Commissioner of Higher Education a cabinet position. Issues: Desire to centralize authority over higher education to improve coordination; desire to increase governor's role in higher education. Not enacted. (2) Proposed by legislature, 1990. Proposal: Abolish Higher Education Coordinating Board. Issues: Desire to enhance institutional autonomy; power struggle between Coordinating Board and an institution. Not enacted. (3) Proposed by State Comptroller, 1994. Proposal: Combine Higher Education Coordinating Board with Board of Education. Issue: Effort to reduce expenditures. Not enacted.

26. Utah. Proposed by governor, legislature, and Board of Regents, 1994. Proposal: Consider restructuring as part of strategic planning process. Issues: Desire to increase accountability; desire to reduce program duplication; provide for better coordination; desire to improve institutional outcomes; effort to improve productivity; effort to reduce expenditures; desire to increase the role of the governor and legislature in higher education; power struggle between the state's Higher Education and education agencies over governance of five applied technology institutions. Enacted.

27. Virginia. (1) Proposed by Council of Higher Education, 1994. Proposal: Permit institutions to operate independent of state accounting, purchasing, and personnel departments, with post-audit. Issues: Desire to improve institutional outcomes; effort to improve productivity; enhance institutional autonomy; effort to contain expenditures. Enacted and being piloted by several institutions. (2) Proposed by Council of Higher Education, 1994. Proposal: Direct institutions to prepare campus restructuring plans (for faculty workload, rewards and incentives, curriculum streamlining, learning productivity, performance-based programming, and administrative improvements); Council of Higher Education to prepare a restructuring plan for its operations as well. Issues: Desire to improve institutional outcomes; effort to improve productivity; enhance institutional autonomy; effort to contain expenditures. Enacted.

28. Washington. (1) Proposed by legislature, 1994. Proposal: Reduce the authority of the Coordinating Board and the legislature over the institutions by eliminating salary restrictions and permitting the institutions to set tuition, carry forward funds from one budget to the next, operate in accordance with simplified state budget procedures, and contract out for services; permit the Coordinating Board to contract with independent institutions. Issues: Effort to improve productivity; enhance institutional autonomy; effort to reduce expenditures in light of passage of an initiative limiting state expenditures; desire to convert public higher education to a high tuition/high financial aid model. Not enacted. (2) Proposed by legislature, 1994. Proposal: Creation of a Legislative Coordinated Study of Higher Education with a broad charge, including an examination of major restructuring options. Issues: study arose as a result of the consideration of the bill cited above.

29. West Virginia. Proposed by governor, 1989. Proposal: Replace a single statewide governing board with one for the university system and one for the state and community college system; coordinating role to be performed by the Secretary of Education and the Arts. Issues: Dissatisfaction with previous board's responsiveness to the changing needs of the state; desire to increase accountability; reduce program duplication; provide for better coordination among institutions of similar mission; desire to improve institutional outcomes; effort to improve productivity; enhance institutional autonomy. Enacted.

Appendix Notes

1. I sent a survey to the state higher education executive officers in 49 states in April 1994; Wyoming does not have a state-level official in such a capacity. In June 1994, I sent follow-up requests to the 10 nonrespondents, resulting in responses from all but Idaho and Massachusetts. The states not listed in this appendix reported no proposals for state-level restructuring during 1989-1994. When proposals were still pending at the time of the original survey, I collected information from articles in the Chronicle of Higher Education, from correspondence in April 1995, and from telephone calls in September 1995.

2. Massachusetts did not respond to the survey. This information comes from interviews with Higher Education Coordinating Council staff and from McGuinness, Epper and Arredondo (1994).

3. The bill that was passed was a less complex proposal than the one originally proposed; it substituted "semi-independent state agency" for the initially proposed "public corporation."

4. A compromise version of this bill was passed, reducing the commission's membership from 18 to 14, all appointed by the governor according to the following distribution: one from each of the state's six Congressional districts, four from the state at large, three from the trustees of public institution, and one (without vote) representing independent institutions. The bill also incorporated the study proposed in no. 4, another competing bill.

5. This bill was incorporated into the compromise bill that modified the commission's membership. A study committee was established with a reporting deadline of February 1, 1996.

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