Public Policy for the 21st Century:
Addressing Potential Conflicts in University-Industry Collaboration

Teresa Isabelle Daza Campbell

Tables

As the economy shifts from a heavy emphasis on defense science and technology toward applying university innovation to commercial markets, decision makers within universities, businesses, and government agencies are eager to learn how to shape successful partnerships. These collaborative ¹ relationships permeate universities across the country, taking a variety of forms that range from consulting to industrial affiliates programs to collaborative research. While these relationships offer numerous benefits (Fairweather, 1988; Geisler & Rubenstein, 1989; Peters & Fusfeld, 1982), [End Page 357] many policy-related concerns grow from the fear that, as individuals within universities become more attuned to the needs and rewards of the economic marketplace, academic priorities may be replaced with profit-oriented priorities. Because university-industry relationships introduce unique commercial considerations into the academic realm (Ashford, 1983; Caldert, 1983), they have received significant attention in the media and have been given high priority on the federal agenda, even though the actual proportion of collaborative faculty remains fairly small. Of course, a large number of collaborative activities are not problematic, but the partnerships that do experience difficulties have been highlighted sufficiently to raise a number of concerns. Among the potential problems least understood are topics related to potential conflicts--the focus of this study.

In a barrage of articles, potential conflict issues that might arise from collaborative relationships have been propelled to the forefront of public attention. The Chronicle of Higher Education and other publications have frequently and consistently indicated that problems outlined in the literature as potential are, in fact, occurring in practice (Blumenstyk, 1993a-d; Carey, 1992, 1994; Cordes, 1992, 1993a-f, 1994; Jaschik, 1993; Marshall, 1995; Nicklin, 1993a-c; Ponce, 1994; Solomon, 1993; Wheeler, 1993). These articles have prompted investigations by governmental agencies to determine the accuracy and effects of these serious allegations. At the same time, academic researchers, university administrators, and representatives of federal agencies are seeking ways to minimize potential conflicts.

Several scholars have eloquently discussed some of the difficulties that might arise out of collaboration between the academic and industrial sectors (Ashford, 1983; Caldert, 1983; Fairweather, 1988; Geisler & Rubenstein, 1989; Peters & Etzkowitz, 1900; Peters & Fusfeld, 1982); however, few have explored collaborators' views toward the specific issues raised. This study seeks to investigate empirically the views of university and industry representatives toward specific potential conflict topics. Most scholars approach the topic of university-industry relationships by focusing on norms and counternorms, suggesting ways to accommodate differences between the two cultures; in doing so, they assume that the differences will be preserved. In contrast, this study operates from the premise that the two organizations are adapting to each others' needs and developing ways to satisfy the requirements of both cultures. This research explores the possibility that, as these relationships evolve, collaborative individuals may be developing a different set of norms from those held by noncollaborative individuals. By investigating perspectives related to potential conflicts, this research highlights key shifts that may be emerging and provides a better understanding of the complex set of values and beliefs held by representatives in the academic and industrial sectors. [End Page 358]

Background

Since conflicts issues are only nebulously defined, I conducted a literature search to identify distinctive areas of concern. Scholars generally discussed three areas of potential conflicts: conflict of interest, conflict of commitment, and conflict over internal equity. I used these three areas as the basis of inquiry to develop a survey instrument.

Potential Conflict of Interest

As discussed in the literature, conflict of interest issues center on financial or economic issues that stem from use of funds, inappropriate influence, and the ownership of patents and licensing. For example, university ownership of company stock can raise several potential conflict of interest questions. Some authors argue that a university can benefit from a steady flow of revenue earned from equity participation in a new business development (Bok, 1982; Sanford, 1982), while others suggest that university ownership of stock creates a vested interest that is likely to have an adverse affect on the status, treatment, and recruitment of faculty (Fassin, 1991; Geisler & Rubenstein, 1989; Lee, forthcoming; Peters & Etzkowitz, 1990; Peters & Fusfeld, 1982; Rahm, 1994; Reams, 1986; Wood, 1992).

Another sample issue is the commingling of federal and private dollars. Peters and Fusfeld (1982) suggest that universities may be inappropriately mingling funds obtained from the federal government with monies obtained from industry to conduct proprietary research. Further, academics may place a higher priority on their personal financial interests than on research or institutional goals. For example, in a summary of potential conflicts, Zuckerman (1993) suggested that academics may influence or withhold research results to ensure the continued sales of the company sponsoring the research. If this is true, the academic may be placing her or his personal financial interest above the norms and values of scholarly research activity. Control over the direction of research and the amount of time the academic must wait before publishing or presenting research results also fall in this category.

This category also includes the university ownership of patents and the granting of exclusive licenses for university technology. For example, scholars raise questions such as these: Is it appropriate for faculty to act as entrepreneurs, holding patents and starting spinoff-companies, when they are drawing a full-time salary from the institution? Some authors have pointed out that universities now have the opportunity to invest income earned from licensing royalties or equity earned from spinoffs into basic research projects that are no longer funded by federal, state, and private agencies (Sanford, 1982; Bok, 1982). However, recent scholars see the current trend less optimistically as fostering a special class of state-subsidized entrepreneurs (Slaughter, 1993b). [End Page 359]

Potential Conflict of Commitment

In the main, conflict of commitment is the umbrella term for issues centering on the allocation of time and energy to fulfill three primary academic roles: teaching, research, and public service. All academics strive to balance these roles, whether they are involved in collaborative activity or not. Potential conflict of commitment issues focus on the possibility that academics are using opportunities for personal financial gain to prioritize and allocate time to these various roles (Dickson, 1984; Etzkowitz, 1983; Slaughter & Rhoades, 1990; Rhoades & Slaughter, 1991a; Slaughter, 1990). For example, some authors suggest that collaborative academics are conducting their industry-related research activities so frequently that it exceeds the usual university allotment of one day per week (Etzkowitz, 1983; Fassin, 1991). As collaborative activity consumes more and more of academics' time, these authors suggest, academic roles such as teaching and gratis public service are being compromised. Perhaps the least explored topic in this area is the potential conflict between academics' commitment to their students and their desire to sustain long-term relationships with research-sponsoring firms.

Collaborative academics contend that industry-sponsored research helps support their graduate students. Faculty serve as teachers and mentors in the laboratory while the student gets exposure to real-world applications. However, many scholars agree with Hackett (1990): "Principles and practices that the academic as mentor would prefer are inconsistent with the needs of the [principal investigator] as employer" (p. 267; emphasis in original). Others suggest that students may be treated as indentured servants who are used to complete the academic research of faculty members and are then obliged to work for the collaborating company for a fixed number of years (Blumenthal et al., 1986a-b; Louis et al., 1989). In short, scholars are concerned about a possible blurring between graduate education and commercial activities (Slaughter & Rhoades, 1990). Specifically, when students are selected for graduate education according to their willingness to keep study results confidential or when foreign students are not admitted to a program for fear they will take proprietary knowledge to their home country, is the faculty member demonstrating more commitment to his or her role as teacher/mentor or as collaborator?

Potential Conflict over Internal Equity

Issues related to differing abilities to obtain significant rewards from within the organization fall under the rubric of conflict of internal equity (Fassin, 1991; Slaughter, 1993a-b; Wood, 1992). Many authors believe that internal institutional budget allocations tend to favor departments able to align themselves with the external market (Rhoades & Slaughter, 1991b). These disciplines may receive higher salaries and increased departmental budgets. In contrast, academic departments less able to solicit outside resources are often downsized or cut during budget reductions (Slaughter, 1993a). Academic [End Page 360] disciplines able to position themselves close to the market have greater opportunities to gain access to funds and to receive recognition and prestige for their efforts. Similarly, the ever-present disparity in salary levels between science and engineering faculty and social science and fine arts faculty has grown into a significant rift between the disciplines. Some authors suggest that this gap is detrimental to collegiality and may undermine the current emphasis on interdisciplinary study (Etzkowitz, 1983; Fairweather, 1988; Geisler & Rubenstein, 1989; Louis et al., 1989; Peters & Fusfeld, 1982; Rhoades & Slaughter 1991b; Slaughter 1993a). Conversely, other authors maintain that the divergence in salaries may reflect the marketplace, flowing logically from the dynamics of a free enterprise economy (Bok, 1993).

Lastly, academic workload is another internal equity issue that may be affected by collaborative activity. Some authors point out that noncollaborative faculty resent assuming additional responsibilities--such as service on internal committees and teaching undergraduates--because their collaborative peers no longer have the time (Etzkowitz, 1983; Schaffer, 1990). These discrepancies in access to resources, salary, and workload have created friction both within and among university departments.

Theory

To examine issues of potential conflicts, this study uses DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) theory of institutional isomorphism. This theory suggests that organizations and the actors within them become more similar as a result of three simultaneously occurring forces: the requirements of external or regulatory agencies (coercive); the examples set by other organizations about how to respond appropriately to difficulties or uncertainty (mimetic); and the influences of peers or professional groups (normative). In responding to these influences, organizations begin to look alike in structure and often implement analogous policies. Organizational members come to share similar attitudes, norms, and beliefs, adopting the views of their peers and role models. Institutional isomorphism suggests that those involved in collaborative activity will share similar perspectives about potential conflicts of interest because they are influenced by similar federal and state regulations, they model their activities after their successful counterparts, and they interact with each other sufficiently to form a unique professional peer group.

Although isomorphism as described by DiMaggio and Powell focuses on institutions that operate in the same types of environments, I use their perspective to explore the possibility that organizations from two different sectors, academic and industrial, may become more similar since their collaborative members are working in the same policy and production arena, interact frequently with each other, and experience similar pressures and uncertainties. I hypothesize that, as a result of all three isomorphic forces, [End Page 361] coercive, normative, and mimetic, universities and firms involved in collaborative activity, as well as collaborative individuals, converge in their views on potential conflicts. Further, this view is likely to be different than the views of individuals who are not involved in collaborative activity.

Method

The Survey Instrument

The mailed questionnaire used statements that reflected the issues about potential conflicts as outlined in the literature. (See 3, 4, and 5 for examples of the statements). Unlike most studies that employ two distinct sets of questions for academe and industry, this study consisted of statements that were exactly the same for both audiences; the two surveys were different only in the demographic section which solicited data relevant to the particular sector. ² The survey questions tapped complex areas where value convergence was possible on issues of potential conflicts issues, rather than assuming that the academic and industrial sectors would have separate and dichotomous norms. The instrument consisted of questions in a Likert-scale format ³ that asked the respondents to indicate the degree to which they agreed with a statement or the extent to which specific issues should be considered a conflict of interest. The questionnaire was pretested with twelve individuals representative of the targeted population.

Targeted Population

I sent the survey instrument to the 12 largest public ⁴ institutions for each of the Carnegie classifications (Carnegie Foundation, 1987), Research I Universities through Liberal Arts Colleges. In industry, I targeted the largest 60 companies ranked by stock market value and listed in Business Week's "R&D Scoreboard" (1993) as well as the highest- and lowest-ranked firm within each of the "R&D Scoreboard" industrial sector categories. To include small businesses in this group of large and mid-sized firms, I supplemented the list with the top 45 small companies listed in Inc. Magazine (Mangelsdorf, 1992) among the 500 fastest-growing independent, private companies in the United States. This procedure yielded a total of 86 colleges/universities and 165 firms. [End Page 362]

For the academic component, I mailed surveys to administrators, ⁵ department chairs, ⁶ and faculty. I identified individuals occupying administrative and department chair positions in the 1993 Higher Education Directory (The hep, 1993) and by telephone inquiries. To encourage the participation of key faculty within each institution, I sent the chairs two extra survey packets and asked them to give one to a faculty member involved in collaborative activity and the other to a faculty member who was not. I used a parallel procedure in the industrial component to identify managers ⁷ and employees. I identified company officials using the Corporate Yellow Book (Monitor, 1993), Ward's Business Directory of U.S. Private and Public Companies (Gale Research, 1994; "America's," 1993), and Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives (1992). I likewise asked these managers, in addition to filling out their own survey, to distribute one additional questionnaire to an employee who was involved with academe and the other to an employee who was not.

Survey and Response

The survey packet consisted of a personally addressed cover letter, a survey instrument with an envelope providing return postage to a pre-printed address, and the additional survey instruments which consisted of a standard cover letter and envelope with return postage to a pre-printed address stapled to the questionnaire. A brightly colored notice with concise instructions for distributing the additional surveys separated the addressee's questionnaire from the packets to be distributed to others. To protect the confidentiality of participants, each questionnaire was stamped with a sequence number. For follow-up and tracking purposes, this number was also stamped on a master list that contained only the individual's name, position, and organization.

Three waves of responses were solicited. Initially, targeted participants were asked to return the survey within two weeks. Two weeks after the requested survey submission date, a second-wave mailing went out to individuals who had not returned their questionnaires. Three months after the initial packets were mailed, I made telephone calls to encourage the participation of persons not responding to either mailing. [End Page 363]

Survey Sample

At least one individual from 76% of the targeted organizations participated in the survey. In academe, 80% of the participants came from Research (I & II) or Doctoral Granting (I & II) institutions; and in industry, 75% of the respondents came from firms that employed more than 3,000 employees. I received responses from over 95 university administrators and 275 faculty members representing social science and fine arts (25%), science and engineering (44%), and business (31%). I received completed surveys from industrial sector employees involved in research (66%) as well as those not involved in research (33%). For analytical purposes, an academic was considered to be involved in collaborative activity if he or she checked one or more of the choices to the question outlined in Table 1. A similar question was posed to industry representatives to determine whether the individual was involved in collaborative activity.

Calculation of the survey response rate proved to be a challenge. Because targeted respondents were asked to distribute questionnaires to individuals within their department, it was impossible to determine whether these unknown potential respondents had actually received a survey instrument. Although it is conceivable that many of these completely anonymous respondents never had an opportunity to participate, particularly if the known respondent chose not to participate, in a deliberate effort to take a conservative approach, I assumed that the additional surveys were distributed. This conservative assumption yielded a minimum response rate for eligible survey participants of 34%. [End Page 364]

Evaluating responses at one point compared with later responses is a widely used method to check for potential measurement errors (Rossi, Wright, & Anderson, 1983). To ensure that the results were reliable, I compared first-and second-wave respondents, using cross tabulation and chi-squared statistics for a number of key characteristics, including involvement in collaborative activity, income level, age range, position in the organization, and field of specialization. No substantive differences were found, thus verifying that the resulting sample is representative of the targeted population and is reliable. These analyses also demonstrated that further solicitation of responses through additional waves would not yield a different set of responses.

Potential Conflict Issues as Viewed by Respondents

The previous discussion highlighted the manner in which scholars have pondered issues related to possible conflicts. However, few studies have sought to identify individuals' views on specific potential conflicts issues, and few have explored whether these topics are perceived similarly by university and industry representatives.

To determine how respondents grouped potential conflict issues, I conducted a factor analysis using an oblique rotation to acknowledge the possibility that the constructs might be somewhat related. ⁸ I analyzed the views of [End Page 365] [Begin Page 367] university and industry respondents separately. Three distinct groupings emerged that were consistent for both the university and industry respondents but which were slightly different from the categories developed based on the literature. (See Table 2). I developed scales for each of the three types of conflicts; ⁹ the reliabilities of each grouping ranged from a standardized alpha of .64 to .75. ¹⁰ Following is a discussion of these differences.

Potential Conflict of Interest Scale

Although the literature addresses a diverse array of subjects under the rubric of conflict of interest, the respondents' pattern of response suggests that they viewed this topic primarily in terms of financial and revenue-generating activities. (See Table 3.) Statements within the potential conflict of interest (PCOI) scale included: "University-industry collaborative activity should be considered part of the public service aspect of academics' responsibilities" and "University income from collaborative research is in the public interest." Salary equity is also a part of this image. The statement, "Academic salaries should be market driven, even if science and engineering professors are paid more than liberal and fine arts professors," was not seen as an issue related to the fair treatment of academics across disciplines. Instead, the participants' pattern of response suggests that they thought of salary issues along the same lines as other opportunities to increase revenue. [End Page 367] [Begin Page 369]

Interestingly, most of the statements included in this group were related to the actions or responsibilities of the organization, not of the individual (i.e., "Organizations should hold patents" and "Public institutions should not grant exclusive licenses" [reverse coded]). This finding suggests that respondents support the incentives and mechanisms that universities put in place to encourage collaborative activity. With the exception of patent holding, the respondents viewed negatively any statement that presented a scenario in which individuals sought creative ways to increase revenue. For example, the statement, "An academic fails to disclose patentable information to the university" might reflect a revenue-generating activity for the individual, but the respondents expressed disagreement with it, perhaps because this activity goes against most universities' policies to disclose patentable inventions. This finding implies that individuals are restricted to the use of revenue-generating mechanisms created and sanctioned by the organization.

Potential Conflict of Commitment Scale

The grouping of statements related to potential conflict of commitment issues suggests that respondents think of conflict of commitment in terms of academics' commitment to their academic duties versus their loyalty to a research sponsor. (See Table 4.) Unexpectedly, the pattern of response suggests that they view inappropriate influence in terms of loyalty to the organization, rather than as the potential for financial gain or possible conflict of interest. For example, the statement, "An academic influences research results to ensure continued sales for a company," might have fallen under the rubric of PCOI. Strong agreement with this statement would have suggested that the academic's financial interest should be prioritized over the academic's responsibility to conduct research according to scholarly norms. Instead, respondents viewed this statement in terms of loyalty or commitment to the academic profession and its corresponding norms, suggesting that they compared scholarly research conventions to the academic's role as a company advocate. Thus, issues related to potential conflict of commitment are perceived as a potential difficulty with divided loyalties. It is interesting to note that these divided loyalties were generally attributed to individuals, not organizations. That is, respondents tend to attribute inappropriate activity or misconduct to "bad" or "deviant" individuals.

This pattern of response does not acknowledge the possibility that organizational policies or reward structures might create conditions that promote divided loyalties. In the literature, several authors look deeper into the organization for a plausible explanation of academics' actions (Kenney, 1986; Luton & Zinke, 1989). These scholars are not necessarily accusing faculty of misconduct or fraud; instead, they view academics as organizational members who are responding intelligently to the incentives that may be intrinsic [End Page 369] [Begin Page 371] in collaborative activities. Responses to this survey suggested that respondents simply may not recognize the possible existence of institutionalized financial incentives that might encourage collaborative faculty to stray from academic traditions. This perspective contains a seemingly inherent contradiction: researchers deeply enmeshed in the workings of a free-market enterprise are expected to forego the potential rewards at their fingertips because they are public servants whose interest and earnings should stand apart from the activity to which they have dedicated most of their life.

Potential Conflict over Internal Equity Scale

The potential conflict over internal equity (PCIE) factor was fairly consistent with the literature. (See Table 5.) A sample statement from this grouping is: "Other members of an academic department should absorb most of an industry-sponsored academic's teaching responsibilities." This question probed whether academics involved in collaborative activity should carry a reduced teaching load. Survey participants' pattern of response clearly suggested that they view issues related to workload and access to institutional resources in terms of internal equity.

Interestingly, respondents also included treatment of students under this umbrella. Questions pertaining to students were related to academics' responsibility to treat students in the same way they are treated in noncollaborative departments. Based on the literature, I had anticipated that student-related issues might be viewed in terms of academics' commitment to students as teacher and mentor compared with their commitment to collaborative activities. Instead, respondents indicated their belief that all faculty should spend the same amount of time with students and that students should receive similar treatment across the various academic disciplines.

Thus, the study successfully captured three separate aspects of potential conflicts. Although these groupings are slightly different from the usual manner in which they are discussed in the literature, the reliabilities for the respondents' three groupings were sufficiently high (over 64%) that I developed a summary scale for each of the three categories based on the participants' perspective. The use of these summary scales aided in exploring the respondents' perspective toward potential conflicts issues and facilitated the hypotheses.

Comparison of Responses Based on Involvement

I conducted separate one-way ANOVAs for PCOI, PCOC, and PCIE to investigate whether there was a difference in perspective among collaborative individuals compared with noncollaborative individuals. (See fig. 1.) I used the Sheffé post hoc comparison technique because it is the most widely utilized and stringent comparison (Shavelson, 1988). Since the survey [End Page 371] used a Likert-scale format, I plotted responses according to whether representatives' views of potential conflicts were more positive toward collaborative activity or more negative.

Positive responses indicate that respondents are open-minded toward changes in academic norms that facilitate increased collaborative activity. For example, persons indicating that they strongly agree with the statement, [End Page 372] "Universities should hold patents," convey a more positive view toward collaborative activity than those who strongly disagree with the statement. Those who disagree are more negative toward collaborative activity since they do not want universities involved in patenting activities.

Potential Conflict of Interest

The analysis supported the hypothesis that collaborative individuals view potential conflict of interest issues similarly. Further, the responses of noncollaborative university and industry representatives were statistically (at the .05 level) and substantively different compared to the responses of collaborative individuals. Although all respondents viewed potential conflict of interest primarily in terms of possible financial gain through increased salary or revenues from patents and licensing, those involved in collaborative activity indicated that they want greater flexibility and more opportunities to obtain financial rewards. While those not involved believe that university-industry collaborative activities should be encouraged, they view more negatively the amount and type of financial gain that should be pursued.

Generally, this finding suggests that individuals involved in collaborative activity believe that universities and academics should hold patents and that exclusive licenses should be viewed as promoting mutual interest for both universities and industry. In the main, the respondents thought that institutions and individuals should be allowed to pursue collaborative activities and collect the corresponding revenue and rewards. In contrast, those not involved in collaborative activity were more conservative. While they were willing to accept revenue-generating activities as a part of academic life, their agreement with the statements was weak in comparison to the group involved in collaborative activity.

This finding is perhaps the most intriguing since it suggests that all survey respondents endorse activities related to university-industry collaborative relationships, while those already involved want organizations and individuals to delve deeper into patenting, licensing, and revenue generating ventures.

Potential Conflicts of Commitment/Internal Equity

The analyses provided no evidence that those involved in collaborative activities view potential conflict of commitment and potential conflict over internal equity issues differently than those not involved; the hypotheses was not supported for these scales. Substantively, all respondents viewed these issues similarly; thus, assertions that two classes of researchers are being created as a result of collaborative activity (Etzkowitz, 1983; Schaffer, 1990) are not necessarily supported. If two classes are being created, this study shows that most academics do not object. Individuals from academic disciplines such as arts and social sciences do not indicate distress about the [End Page 373] potential negative impact that collaborative activity may have on their discipline. Perhaps they do not recognize possible shifts such as increased prestige for academics who obtain corporate funding (which is heavily concentrated in the fields of science and engineering) and diminished internal resources for academic fields that typically do not have close ties with industry. Institutions have developed and continue to create policies that reward collaborative effort through increased internal resources, opportunities to gain licensing revenue, and a diverse array of support centers (e.g. offices of technology transfer, research support offices). Instead of recognizing potential inequalities in such shifts, all respondents indicate strong support for collaborative relationships as well as traditional academic norms and activities.

Implications and Conclusions

In summary, the study showed that respondents involved in collaborative activity are more positive about financial opportunities and the ability to achieve greater monetary rewards than their noninvolved counterparts. However, these revenue-generating activities should not interfere with academics' commitment to conventional academic duties, especially teaching. Although those involved may view collaborative activity as part of the public service aspect of their academic responsibilities, they also have clear expectations that these activities should not exceed most universities' expectation that 20% of an academic's time (one day per week, on the average) will be dedicated to service activities. Respondents did not support options that allow active researchers to "buy out" of the number of units they are required to teach. Mechanisms like these are designed to reduce an academic's teaching load, based on such considerations as the amount of corporate and government funding received and the level of involvement by the academic. Some of these plans go so far as to excuse collaborative faculty members from teaching for an entire academic year. Respondents are very aware that teaching makes their identity as academics unique, and they are not supportive of undue interference with or diminishment of this role.

Given that many collaborative activities, such as joint research, require a significant investment of time, the respondents' expectations may be unrealistic. If, as suggested, faculty are required to adhere to strict academic norms while still engaging in collaborative activity, a series of unacknowledged internal equity problems could arise. For example, those involved in collaborative activity might work longer and harder than those not involved, since they could not count on lighter course loads or less frequent interaction with students. Because respondents are fairly permissive about financial gain, perhaps they would approve of licensing revenues and higher [End Page 374] salaries, as dictated by the marketplace, as incentives for shouldering the increased workload of collaborative activity.

Survey participants apparently support the involvement of organizations in collaborative activities but tend to attribute inappropriate behavior to individuals. Respondents do not explicitly acknowledge the possible existence of financial incentives that might encourage collaborative faculty to stray from scholarly traditions. They imply that only a few wayward individuals will be unable to balance their teaching and collaborative responsibilities. For example, consider the statement: "A department does not admit a foreign student to a program because s/he may take sponsored research knowledge to her/his home country upon graduation." Using the following logic, the participants might have recognized that industry-sponsored research has the potential to create incentives for faculty to protect their sponsor, the sponsor's products, and the corresponding market niche: The student is from a foreign country; through industry-sponsored research the student will gain knowledge about the sponsoring U.S. firm's products; the student may take this new knowledge back to the home country; a foreign firm in the student's home country might produce the same product; the competitive advantage of the sponsoring U.S. firm will be diminished as a result of the entry of the foreign firm into the marketplace; if the academic would like to continue the U.S. firm's research sponsorship, there is an incentive for the academic to refuse the foreign student's application for admission to the department. (It is also possible that faculty are pressured by their sponsoring firm to restrict the involvement of foreign students.) Academics who use such logic are not necessarily deliberately engaged in unethical behavior, they may simply "be pulled into behavior that violates or compromises standards for scientific research" (Luton & Zinke, 1989, 205). Because faculty presumably make persistent efforts to increase their resources for their department or unit and its research endeavors, this behavior may be seen as an intelligent response to financial incentives that might be intrinsic in collaborative activities.

The fact that these respondents attributed the potential for inappropriate behavior to delinquent individuals, rather than to institutional policies and reward structures that exist to promote collaborative activity, suggests that they view unacceptable behavior as individual misconduct. Survey participants' responses suggest that this behavior stems from divided loyalties to the university and an outside entity. They seem to view conflict of commitment as a situation in which each academic must choose whether his or her loyalty will be to the profession and academe or to commitments outside the university. This situation is different from the description of conflict of commitment presented in the literature that focuses on the faculty member's possible misbehavior in allocating time to academic duties and [End Page 375] balancing diverse and possibly competing roles. When the two conceptions are combined (the respondents' and the literature's), the implication is that an individual can and should periodically inventory the amount of time dedicated to students, to teaching, and to collaborative activities, thus minimizing the potential for a conflict of commitment.

Regardless of the form and type of collaborative relationship in which academics become involved, decision makers should hold firm to the twin goals of prioritizing teaching and treating students equitably. When responses to questions about potential conflicts are combined with responses to questions regarding academics' contribution to society, the implication is that teaching and involvement with students is essential to academe. Alterations and expansions of activities related to research and public service may be tolerated, perhaps even approved, as long as the fundamental role of teaching is preserved. To be true to their academic identity, university representatives should ensure that the scale is tipped in favor of teaching or--at a minimum--is delicately balanced so that teaching activities are equal to collaborative activities.

Teresa Isabelle Daza Campbell is an Assistant Research Professor at the Department of Management and Policy at The University of Arizona. The dissertation from which this paper was drawn was honored as Dissertation of the Year by the Association for the Study of Higher Education, November 1995, in Orlando, Florida. She expresses appreciation to the Research on Science and Technology Program for a grant from the National Science Foundation which partly supported this study. However, her opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. She also thanks Sheila Slaughter, Gary Rhoades, and Susan Heckler for providing invaluable guidance and scholarly insight throughout this project.

Notes

1. I use "collaborators" to mean academics who work with firms or industry representatives who work with universities. "Collaborative" describes any interactive activity between these individuals and/or entities.

2. For the complete survey instrument, see Campbell (1995) or Campbell and Slaughter (1995).

3. The instrument also included a few fill-in-the-blank and open-ended questions, but I do not discuss them in this paper.

4. I did not include private universities, proprietary schools, and community colleges in this study. Rather, I focused on universities supported by taxpayer dollars. I did not include nonpublic institutions in this baseline research because private universities are often established for express purposes, including economic development and strong alliances with industry. Respondents from these schools might complicate the data.

5. Targeted administrators included the Vice President for Research, the Director of the Office of Technology Transfer, and Director of the Industrial Liaison Office.

6. I selected the chairs of the departments of chemistry, electrical engineering, computer systems, marketing, music, and psychology because of how they are presented in the literature. Chemistry, engineering, and computer systems are considered involved in collaborative activity; and marketing, music, and psychology are not.

7. Targeted executives included the Vice President for Research/Technology, the Vice President for Manufacturing/Operations, the Vice President for University Relations, and the Vice President for New Business Development.

8. The correlations were not strong, indicating that distinct concepts had been identified.

9. See Tables 3, 4, and 5 for factor loadings. I assigned the statements to a group based on the highest factor loading. Questions that loaded similarly on two factors were not included in any of the groupings. University and industry loadings paralleled each other; the highest loading for each of the statements was on the same factor. Statements with a factor loading of .30 or less were included in the category only if further analysis demonstrated that the statement contributed to a greater reliability for that scale.

10. Nunally (1978) supports the acceptability of these alphas.

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