Isomorphism, Homogeneity, and Rationalism in University Retrenchment

Gordon S. Gates

Currently, as in the early 1970s and 1980s, many universities throughout the United States are experiencing government funding cutbacks or are preparing for reductions in financial support (El-Khawas, 1992; Neumann, 1995). Universities are engaging in various reorganizational processes: retrenchment, reconfiguration, or restructuring. University reorganization often employs committee investigations and recommendations using the strategies of budget relocation, strategic planning, and market alignment. Rationalism is a major tenet of decision making in retrenchment to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in university operations (Cameron, 1983; Cameron, Kim, & Whetton 1987; Hardy, 1988, 1990; Gumport, 1993; Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Olswang, 1987). Recognizing that rationality is bounded (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1957) and that universities are loosely coupled (Weick, 1976), several scholars argue that rational choice models are analytically poor when applied to retrenchment (Ashar & Shapiro, 1990; Hardy, 1988, 1990; Skolnik, 1987) and in their ability to explain university [End Page 253] governance in general (Birnbaum, 1988). Instead scholars discuss the ways in which rational-choice models provide political, academic, and ethical defenses for decisions (Ashar & Shapiro, 1990; Dennison, 1987; Olswang, 1987; Parker, 1986).

Indeed, much research on university retrenchment emphasizes the importance of organizational context and factors such as internal environment, history, politics, and culture for explaining decisions (Bean & Kuh, 1984; Hardy, 1990; Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Rubin, 1977; Skolnik, 1987). A retrenchment literature based on case studies examines these factors as they relate to rationalism (Ashar & Shapiro, 1990; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Hardy, 1988; Hills & Mahoney, 1978), power (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Gumport, 1993; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974), management (Cyert, 1978; Dennison, 1987; Melchiori, 1982; Olswang, 1987; Rubin, 1979), and faculty (Kerlin & Dunlap, 1993; Dallam & Hoyt, 1983). University administrators are admonished to give primary consideration to these internal factors in university retrenchment (Bowen, 1983; Cyert, 1978; Parker, 1986; Schmidtlein, 1990). Thus, much of the literature discusses a modified rational-choice model.

Recently Slaughter (1993) rejects these theories as inadequate--incapable of explaining retrenchment patterns which are observable when data from many organizations are compiled and examined. Slaughter argues a neo-Marxist postmodern position which does not "assume free and rational markets, but . . . look[s] to discover how changes in professional labor markets were connected to changes in the class structure and political economic power" (p. 253). Her study, based on a review of cases related to grievances of faculty reported in the "Academic Freedom and Tenure" section of Academe, presents evidence that women and minorities have been disproportionately and negatively impacted by university reorganization as have the fields of education, social sciences, humanities, and the arts. In comparison, faculty in engineering, hard sciences, and business were less seriously impacted. A careful reading of the case studies also reveals this trend (i.e., in program offerings and on organizational charts); but with a focus on the inability of disciplines in the former category, as compared to those in the latter, to obtain support and resources from outside the institution (Hackman, 1985; Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). The literature largely ignores the implications to society of such academic restructuring, while Slaughter identifies such implications as a major topic for discussion.

Further, Slaughter's study of university retrenchment reveals the prevalence of language and strategies synonymous to those used in the down-sizing efforts of corporate America. Language emphasizing financial emergency, and thus the need for strong actions and "making tough decisions" appear in the case studies, but the homogeneousness of retrenchment across universities during the past decade receives little attention. Thus, [End Page 254] Slaughter's study presents an important perspective which explicates homogeneity in university retrenchment language, strategies, and outcomes.

Slaughter attributes these observable retrenchment patterns, based on theory and supported by evidence, to economic and political forces in the market. However, several questions emerge from the analysis of similarities in administrative language and in the mechanisms of retrenchment. Most importantly, her analysis provides little description needed to specifically identify those constraints in the market which pressured universities to retrench or how such pressures resulted in such uniformity in retrenchment outcome. What were the pressures involved? Further, Slaughter views retrenchment as neither contributing to the effectiveness nor efficiency of the university. Rejecting former notions about the role of rationalism in retrenchment, the question becomes: What role does rationalism play in university restructuring since it dominates much of the language surrounding retrenchment?

These are important questions which emerge from Slaughter's analysis; they need further, more detailed attention. Thus, the purpose of this study is to advance a descriptive account of retrenchment at State University ¹ for analysis and interpretation of the following two questions: (a) What pressure(s) surfaced during this university's retrenchment? and (b) What role does rationalism play in the retrenchment of this university?

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

Scholars who study organizations have developed a theory known as institutionalism that poses similar questions to those above. Institutional theory attempts to explain how organizations are constrained by isomorphic pressures to adopt structures and practices of other similar organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Zucker, 1987). Organizational homogeneity results from these pressures. Discussions about the role of rationalism in organizations and organizational homogeneity occupy a central position in the theory (Meyer & Rowen, 1991; Scott, 1987). The theory offers a framework from which to begin the analysis of the data collected for the study.

However, before proceeding, it is important to note that the study did not begin with this theory as its framework. The introduction to this body of literature came in the later part of the study; I was gathering data but had spent a great deal of time observing, interviewing others, thinking, and writing about retrenchment at State University. Indeed, I had begun to test conclusions drawn from the process of highlighting and identifying patterns in events, statements, ideas, and relationships that appeared salient and gave meaning to this retrenchment. The process of coding key concepts [End Page 255] (Strauss, 1987) located throughout the multiple sources had revealed features of retrenchment both discussed and not discussed in the literature. I investigated discrepancies to clarify and determine their analytical accuracy. Reading institutional theory brought focus, clarification, enhancement, and validation to the conclusions that had already begun to emerge.

Institutional Theory

The organizational field is a basic concept of institutional theory. The organizational field describes and defines an organization's environment, which it shares with similar organizations, based on the products/services that are offered to consumers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott & Meyer, 1991). Institutional theorists argue that homogeneity in organizations results from isomorphic pressures in the organizational field.

Isomorphism forces one organization to conform to the other organizations facing the same set of environmental conditions (Hawley, 1968). Specifically, three sources or pressures of institutional isomorphism have been most discussed in the literature: coercive, mimetic, and normative (Scott, 1987). Coercive isomorphism relates to the use of power and sanctions to bring about organizational conformity and is theorized as surfacing around problems of legitimacy. Mimetic isomorphism is associated with actions and plans where organizations copy others in their field and is posited as arising from conditions of environmental uncertainty. Finally, normative isomorphism is tied to professional standards in the organizational field that pressure organizations to conform. These three pressures are not empirically distinct, yet they are understood as deriving from different conditions and may lead to different outcomes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Zucker (1987) calls for investigation which clarifies and specifies the link between these pressures as they arise from different conditions and their outcomes. Thus, this study will attempt to delineate the isomorphic pressures experienced in the retrenchment of this university and specify how they impacted its retrenchment.

Institutional scholars hold that rationalized institutional elements (i.e., hiring, production, and reporting policies and procedures) and complex communication networks are pivotal components that also account for formal structures and practices present in an organizational field. Rationalism plays an important role in this model as particular institutional elements, along with associated structures and practices, become taken for granted in a field and function as myths. Institutionalization is the central concept in the theory and is defined as the dissemination of an organizational structure and/or practice throughout an organizational field based upon "views of important constituents, by knowledge legitimated through the educational system, by social prestige, by the laws, and by the definitions of negligence and prudence used by the courts. . . . [about] rationalized and [End Page 256] impersonal prescriptions that identify various social purposes. . . . and thus in some measure beyond the discretion of an individual participant or organization" (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 44).

Organizational adoption of these rationalized institutional elements are perceived as promoting stability, legitimacy, and resources acquisition (Meyer & Rowan, 1991). However, institutional theorists argue that organizational conformity to institutionalized structures and practices benefit organizations at a cost. Indeed, as Powell (1988) states, the cost of institutionalized environments may be organizational structure and practice determined by "social fitness rather than economic efficiency" (p. 132). DiMaggio and Powell (1991a) expound upon this statement when they state:

Structural change in organizations seems less and less driven by competition or by the need for efficiency. Instead, we contend, bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change occur as the result of processes that make organizations more similar without making them more efficient. . . . Highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, and output. (pp. 63-64)

Participants in organizations are viewed as ceremonially conforming to the rationalized institutional elements prevalent in the organizational field based largely on a belief in their legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1991). Institutional theory has been particularly attentive to the processes of social reproduction and legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b). Thus, this study attended to the reproduction and legitimacy of organizational structures and practices as they relate to rationalism.

Some Particulars about the Data

I gathered the data for this study from the retrenchment of State University (SU), a largely undergraduate, residential, medium-sized, land-grant university in the Pacific Northwest. I specifically examined the retrenchment of one of SU's seven colleges--its College of Human Development. One department that emerged from the reorganization of two of the college's five departments received particular attention. Each department in the college was comprised, on the average, of seventeen faculty, most of whom were male. Female faculty were unequally represented across the departments (i.e., one department at the time of retrenchment was almost 50% female, while the remaining departments were less than 30% female). Student enrollment by gender was also unequal across the departments, but with more female than male students. The largest program in that college enrolled about 800 students per year and was the third largest of its kind in the state.

I used five sources, representing the three levels of the organization (university, college, and department), to construct the descriptive account of [End Page 257] the retrenchment experience to answer the study's two guiding questions. I began collecting data immediately after the university's administration announced that it would implement the retrenchment decisions that had been forwarded to the University Retrenchment Committee by each of the college retrenchment committees. I continued collecting data eight months after the the restructuring was instituted. Previous case studies, as well as Slaughter's study, have been limited to information gathered from the time period just prior to, and just after, the reorganization of the university. From the literature, scholars know that information tends to be distorted during retrenchment (Rubin, 1977). Thus, data gathered during the post-retrenchment period provides a perspective on retrenchment that has been missed in the literature.

I categorized the data gathered for the study by its five sources:

1. SU's central administration. I collected memoranda and reports generated by the University Retrenchment Committee (URC), the central coordinating body of SU's retrenchment. Don Meeks, the Provost of SU, headed the URC. I also compiled official statements from university officials that appeared in newspapers, other university communications, and university publications.

2. College Retrenchment Committee (CRC). Formed in November of 1992 at the request of Benjamin Carroll, the Dean of the College of Human Development, the CRC was discontinued in May 1993. During its six months of operation, the CRC generated a significant paper archive, including numerous minutes, handouts, memoranda, and reports. The CRC originally met bimonthly; but as time progressed, shifted to a weekly schedule and, finally, was meeting almost every other day. Two faculty members, a staff member, plus the chair from each of the college's departments composed the CRC. Dean Carroll and Julie Winters, the Assistant Dean of the college, also attended these meetings.

3. Documents from college and faculty meetings. There were two all-college meetings each semester, one at the beginning and one at the end. All faculty, staff, and graduate teaching/research assistants of the college were required to attend these meetings, which were held at the beginning and end of the semesters. I attended these meetings in the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994 and took extensive notes. I also collected the meetings' agendas, handouts, and minutes. During the study, I also attended the faculty meeting of the newly created department. At these meetings, held on a monthly basis, I took notes and collected materials handed out to attendees.

4. I collected material and literature from the college and departments. Of specific interest were the reports generated by programs for their national accreditating associations. Both departments that were merged into the new department developed extensive documents for their accrediting bodies which articulated essential components, elements, and philosophies. [End Page 258]

5. Intensive interviews with eight faculty from the two merging departments. These interviews occurred during the fall semester of 1993 and lasted from one to one and a half hours. The purpose of the interview was to identify and distinguish important aspects of faculty feelings and attitudes about the college restructuring process. Questions investigated aspects of each faculty member's perception of the purposes, procedures, and products of the retrenchment. I also conducted less formal follow-up interviews and discussions with these faculty. All interviews were transcribed.

Thus, the total collected materials represent an extensive accumulation of information documenting administration and faculty comments, concerns, and communications about the context, process, and outcome of retrenchment. The remainder of the article builds on Wolcott's (1994) typology of description, analysis, and interpretation for making sense of qualitative data. The descriptive account provides a narrative of retrenchment at SU's College of Human Development--it recounts events chronologically to convey essential aspects of what occurred during and after retrenchment. The analysis and interpretation section attempts to identify from the description those features, their associations, and the meanings that address the questions raised in this study.

Telling about an Exemplary Retrenchment

In 1992 SU faced considerable financial stress because of a revenue shortfall in the state's tax base. After several years of consistent funding reductions of around 3%, the financial uncertainty reached a peak with predicted budget rollbacks as high as 15%. The university had already begun the drive to provide 70% funding from sources other than the state legislature. This ratio is forecast to occur in the next decade; but until it does, state funding in 1992 accounted for around 50% of SU's $250 million budget. Thus, Provost Meeks, faced with proposed budget cuts from the legislature, announced a policy of retrenchment in February 1992.

Tending to Fiscal Uncertainty

For the purposes of this case study, I date the "beginning" of the retrenchment experience to early November 1992, when the issue of retrenchment became a prominent discussion item for the university's administration, faculty, and staff and coinciding with Dean Carroll's establishing the College Retrenchment Committee (CRC).

As early as spring of 1992, the University Retrenchment Committee (URC) had been meeting to advise, determine, and coordinate the university's retrenchment proposals, policies, and procedures. By late February 1993, the URC approved the Policy on Retrenchment of Units (PRU); the guiding document on retrenchment for the university's units (programs, [End Page 259] departments, divisions, and colleges). The document uses rational language throughout. Rational logic guides the criteria. And it outlines a rational decision-making process.

The Policy on the Retrenchment of Units begins by stating that reorganization is a "normal, healthy, and desirable" part of university operations. Further, changes in programs and components were to occur through "careful and imaginative consideration of the facts, and decisions . . . guided by such accepted principles" as those located in university publications. Documents specifically listed are: University, Strategic Planning, and the Twentieth Century; Policies and Procedures Manual; and State Higher Education Coordinating Board's Guidelines. Also mentioned in the introduction, as a secondary note, is retrenchment's basis as a response to the "present and foreseen environment of fiscal austerity" and the associated need for an explicit process of reduction.

As the document continues, retrenchment of the units rested upon an analysis of the quality, centrality, need, and cost of units. Quality is defined by nine measurements. The quality of a unit is a function of that unit's national reputation, comparison of products to the products of similar units at other universities, and the status of the unit's accreditation. Specifically, the PRU quality analysis questions the "conformity of the result of retrenchment with national patterns, to facilitate recruitment, retention, and recognition of students and faculty." The centrality of a unit is determined by the degree to which the unit serves or is composed of members from protected groups, affects other units in the university, whether the unit is of a kind that should be present in every land-grant university, and whether it provides products mandated by or necessary to government. The unit's need is defined according to the employment status of faculty in the unit, the reliance of other units on the unit's products, and the present and future market demands for graduates and products. The cost of a unit is based upon the following ten criteria:

(1) relation of the cost of operating a unit and of its size to its contribution to fulfillment of the institution's mission as compared with analogous units in similar institutions, (2) efficiency of a unit, (3) cost of operation of the unit comparison with revenue (grants, contracts, endowments, gifts, and tuition) generated by the unit, (4) level of investment in facilities or equipment that could not be easily redirected, (5) possibility of economies by merger because of similarity to another unit or to other units in mission, orientation, and clienteles, (6) desirability of changing the character of the unit's fiscal support, (7) magnitude of changes in productivity and efficiency produced by retrenchment, (8) possible economies such as economies of scale, advantageous arrangements with vendors, kinds of equipment resulting from partnerships with the private sector, (9) extent to which a unit is self supporting, [End Page 260] and (10) effect of proposed retrenchment on public support and institutional image. (Policy on the Retrenchment of Units, p. 6)

Finally, the PRU discusses the procedures to be followed should a financial emergency occur for governance, budgeting, and displaced personnel.

Drafts of this document were available to the retrenching colleges, as several editions were located throughout the CRC document archives. In fact, at the first meeting of the CRC, Dean Carroll presented a draft to provide direction for the college's retrenchment.

Lens on a College

Dean Carroll clearly articulated the financial stress facing the university at the first CRC meeting. John Larson, a tenured faculty member, in an interview stated, "Right from the beginning we were told that the college needed to restructure for financial reasons. 'Down-sizing,' 'doing more with less,' 'selective excellence' are terms that you hear. They are nice slogans invented to go along with the fact that we are cutting out some programs and collapsing others into units that cost less money to operate." Dean Carroll continually raised the issue of impending cutbacks facing SU (and thus the college) throughout the seven months of CRC's operation--November through May. His stated predictions of percentage cuts to the college ranged from a high of 15 to a low of 3. The dean also relayed the provost's message to the faculty that "cuts will not be across the board." Rather, units not conforming to the PRU criteria were to be cut. "Cuts in programs not individuals" (College Memo, 1993) was Provost Meeks's stated goal, a goal reiterated by Dean Carroll. The dean also emphasized the CRC's proactive mission in conforming the college to the PRU criteria by restructuring it.

Dean Carroll requested that, to determine how the college should proceed with its reorganization, the CRC should: (a) determine perceptions of the college from others outside the college (particularly the provost and other colleges' faculty and administrators), (b) question ways of becoming more efficient and productive in teaching, research, and service (issues related to the PRU guidelines), (c) reconsider the major function of the college (issues of mission); and (d) investigate the structures and reorganization occurring at other comparable institutions. At this first meeting, but also throughout the CRC meetings, both dean and faculty described the college as "frozen, not cohesive, and lacking vitality." The legitimacy of the college was clearly in question at this time. Finally, faculty left the meeting charged with a request to: "(1) evaluate their programs according to the university criteria of quality, need, centrality, and cost; and (2) discuss and suggest revisions to the college mission statement. The report must be ready with our analysis for the CRC meeting in early January" (Department Memo, 1992). [End Page 261]

Each department in the college generated a document for the CRC that outlined, in specifics, how programs met the prioritized criteria. These reports, presented to the CRC in February 1993, largely followed the PRU in both tone and substance. For example, one department discussed the cost of its smallest program as follows: "In 1992 the faculty of this program were awarded grants and contracts in the amount of $645,625, with an additional $482,315 pending. Previous years' awards were: $464,182 in 1991, $585,193 in 1990, and $392,810 in 1989. Enrollment in courses generated 49 student credit hours (SCH) at the 700-800 level, 648 SCH at the 500-600 level, and 1,424 SCH at the undergraduate level during the spring '92 through fall '92 academic year."

With the benefit of these analyses, based on PRU criteria, programs were prioritized at a departmental level and provided a rational basis for program reduction. However, when Dean Carroll requested that programs be prioritized at the college level, some faculty argued that "all of the programs of the college should be recognized as quality programs." Several others voiced concern that more information was needed, that to prioritize programs would be divisive, and that the CRC should concern itself only with policy. The prioritization of programs at the college level did not take place. Instead, the CRC channeled this information toward a focused dialogue on the new mission statement and on developing structural models based on investigations of comparable colleges at other institutions. Indeed, the CRC co-chairs urged this direction in a memo (1993): "A synthesis of the major strengths of each department relative to the university's criteria will lead to a discussion on how this all fits into the mission of the college."

Revising the college's mission statement had been initiated at the first CRC meeting based on an examination of the college's strengths and a prediction of future state needs. The dean's request to recreate the college's mission also involved "broadening our thinking" to incorporate ideals of other similar units on the campus, those in the field, and those at other universities. From this process emerged a revised mission statement centered on the values of diversity, interdisciplinary approaches, and partnerships. These three values are dominant in higher education in general but are particularly dominant within the research and professional standards of this college's disciplines.

Simultaneously, committee members were examining several structural models, also based on meeting PRU criteria and on information about other colleges with similar programs. The committee discussed structures and programming at ten colleges at the following universities: West Virginia University, University of California--Santa Barbara, University of California--Berkeley, Iowa State University, Oregon State University, University of Oregon, Miami University, University of Vermont, Montana State, and University of Rhode Island. The faculty chose these Colleges of Human [End Page 262] Development because they were seen as possessing programs "comparable" to SU's own college. Faculty collected literature and brochures on these programs, made phone calls, and attempted to identify individuals knowledgeable about the restructuring efforts at these institutions. In fact, several times Dean Carroll proposed that the college invite an expert to consult and advise on the college's retrenchment process. Although no consultant was hired, committee members collected a multitude of structural models. Most organizational charts involved a rearrangement of programs based upon organizational structures found at other colleges of human development.

Moreover, this examination of other colleges led to the CRC's recommendation that programs and departments in other colleges on the campus be moved to the College of Human Development. Their rationale was based on national trends in other colleges and other public institutions, the hope of extending the clientele served by the profession, funding requirements that involved collaboration with other programs, and the prospect of developing partnerships with other public institutions and community agencies. The committee also proposed to change the college's name; but Provost Meeks discussed program movement with the university's other deans and decided against both the proposed name change and the proposed program movement. As Dean Carroll stated later, "It may give the appearance [to the state legislature] that we [the university/college] are offering new programs" (College Memo, 1993). Thus, the CRC concentrated on reorganizing programs within the college. Four models for reorganizing the college emerged.

In April 1993, Dean Carroll requested the faculty to vote for one of four final models. In addition, faculty were asked to provide the rationale for their decisions. The tallied votes and comments circulated in a memo to the college's faculty. In these statements appear references to issues of effectiveness, efficiency, quality, credibility, practicality, productivity, and defensibility. For example, one faculty member stated, "When looking at organizational change, two criteria emerge: efficiency and effectiveness. . . . It seems to me that first model brings together programs that should be together, eliminates needless administrative duplication and thus lowers administrative cost, and suggests a broadened mission for the college within the university and state. It does nothing to impede functional programs from prospering and might actually improve conditions for this."

Further, the co-chairs of the CRC summarized faculty comments in a memo (1993): "Those who voted for the model that reduced the college by two departments felt that this option: 1) Enhances collegiality and collaboration; 2) Saves money; 3) Suggest[s] that reducing the college by one department would result in non-equitable cuts; 4) Would bring together programs that should be together; 5) Is more futuristic; 6) Makes a stronger statement to the university that the college is willing to change; 7) Parallels [End Page 263] what is being done in the field." The model which reduced the college by two departments received the largest number of votes.

Trying to Do Good But Not Feeling So Good

State University received a cut of around 4% in the finalized 1993-1995 Biennial Operating Budget. As a whole the university reduced its work force by 200 positions. Staff positions dominated the list, but most of the reduction occurred through retirements or through not filling vacancies. Student tuition was increased, services were decreased, and several programs were eliminated.

For its share, the College of Human Development received a cut of just over 3%. Faculty had voted for the "reduce the college by two [departments] model," but the college was reduced by only one department. This department's undergraduate program was merged with other programs housed in the college's largest department; and, of its two graduate programs, one was combined with another department which provides mostly graduate programming, and the other was split between two departments. The college also did not fill four vacant positions, cut one undergraduate program, and added a Partnership Center to coordinate and facilitate outreach activities for the college that would further the revised college mission. It was established with substantial funding, part of a $1 million grant.

The eight faculty who were interviewed commented at length about the splitting and merging of these departments and the establishing of the Partnership Center. They found the integration of the two graduate programs logical and politically acceptable. For example, Sarah Peterson, tenured and previous administrator, said, "Right now I feel pretty good. But there was a time that we were doing things for the wrong reasons. I think that there came a point where we realized that there was going to be change and so we tried to make the best out of a poor situation. So after all of the politicking and all the meetings and all of the hours and hours we finally came up with something that was acceptable."

These faculty, as evidenced in the interviews and collected materials, saw many colleges at other universities that were retrenching programs in other ways. But these alternatives were not acceptable because of political, historical, and cultural tensions that existed within the college. Faculty indicated that the program, which was split between departments, had a reduced standing in the college faculty and remarked that programs of this kind were experiencing decreased professional status nationwide.

Faculty were concerned that the Partnership Center would create new bureaucracy, and several raised questions about its establishment. Faculty expressed concerns about the formation of the center in written commentaries justifying their vote, and in their interviews. For example, one comment reads, "Structures will not create new ideas and new departments. [End Page 264] New collaborations will not manifest themselves in special centers such as the Partnership Center. Administration should be efficient and supportive in generally recognized ways so that maximum effort can be directed toward making working units and their collaborations as productive as possible." Another stated, "What would be especially counterproductive would be to destroy a department and then add to the college's central bureaucracy."

The name chosen for the newly formed department also reflects conformity to national trends. This department's faculty were decisively influenced in selecting their new department name by what similar departments at other universities were calling themselves. Faculty were concerned about attracting new faculty and students, their accreditation status, the ability of graduates to get jobs, and the support of alumni if the name was peculiar or modified. Long recognized as a state leader in its field, the program name that had dominated the department's identity was replaced with another--the faculty's choice with administration approval--that many similar departments were adopting.

As the semester progressed and other issues arose at the faculty meetings, faculty consistently followed a pattern of attempting to determine what other departments on campus and what similar units at other institutions were doing. Further, faculty discussed the implications of their decisions upon their accreditation status. Finally, faculty were concerned with understanding the position of both Dean Carroll and Provost Meeks when coming to decisions on issues. This pattern--of faculty attempting to identify the position of other similar units, accrediting bodies, and central administration--was important on issues involving the department name, course prefixes, departmental procedures, students, budgeting, conferences, alumni, and departmental governance. The faculty also paid attention to the specific context of the department, as well as accommodating and incorporating the position of others outside the department.

A measure of the success in accommodating these positions occurred at the all-college meeting in December 1993. Here, a full semester after the restructuring of the university had occurred, Provost Meeks commended the college's faculty for their efforts, called the college's restructuring an "exemplar," and said it "provided leadership for the rest of the university." Talking informally after this meeting to a small group that had formed around her, Sharon Miller, a tenured faculty member of the college and member of the URC, stated quietly that several other colleges had virtually ignored the restructuring request from the provost. She confirmed the rumor that a number of members on the URC had thought that the university should have coped with the state budget cuts by dissolving the college and moving its programs into the other colleges. But because of the college's response, the "wolves" had had to move on and were now on the scent of another college weakened by credibility and legitimacy issues. [End Page 265]

Thus, the central administration's perspective of the college was very different in 1993 than in 1992. However, when faculty talked about the process in the interviews, their attention focused on other outcomes. Nathan Holt, succinctly captured a theme reflected in many of the interviews, "My teaching and research have suffered. I only have so much energy. My time has been consumed in committee meetings trying to decide what is going to happen next and what should be done. . . . I just hope that what we now have works; that somehow we will find some commonalties and joint interests. I want to get back to working, reading, writing, and discussing . . . those things that forward the intellectual climate of the college rather than its political standing in the university."

Interpreting Retrenchment

The following section attempts to synthesize the description of retrenchment at SU and literature from the case studies with concepts presented in the theoretical framework. Through this exercise, I address answers to the questions posed at the beginning of the study: (a) What pressure(s) surfaced during this university's retrenchment? and (b) What role does rationalism play in the retrenchment of this university?

Under Pressure

All three isomorphic mechanisms (mimetic, coercive, and normative) are evident in SU's retrenchment. However, each seemed prominent at different times and at different levels in the organization. Additionally, the different pressures appeared to affect participants in the retrenchment in different ways--most noticeably the faculty.

Jumping the Gun. Institutional theory advances the position that coercive isomorphism emerges in an environment where the legitimacy of organizational structures and practices are questioned and that mimetic pressure is exerted in an environment where uncertainty is prominent (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a). As this case study shows, time is an important factor in the connection between the nature of the environment and the type of pressure.

Clearly fiscal uncertainty triggered the proactive retrenchment and was a dominant part of the environment. Provost Meeks was certain that cuts in state funding levels would take place; however, there was a great deal of uncertainty in the amount of the reduction. Further, at the college level, there was a great deal of ambiguity in how the provost's office would distribute cuts across the organization. Cuts were to occur for each unit, but the percentage of those cuts was unclear. The point here is that retrenchment at SU was predominantly the result of uncertainty rather than legitimacy. However, the college's poor credibility at the beginning of the [End Page 266] retrenchment period cannot be ignored. Therefore, coercive isomorphic pressure should be recognized with the mimetic when looking at the college's retrenchment.

Importantly, no sanctions and coercive actions were employed against the college. Neither the state legislature nor the provost ordered retrenchment. The URC guidelines allowed the colleges to propose how they would reduce their budgets rather than imposing changes upon them. Several other colleges responded poorly to the request.

It is possible that under Dean Carroll's leadership the college recognized the precariousness of its position, due to a lack in its perceived legitimacy, and so conformed to the institutionalized elements found in its organizational field. Taking advantage of the uncertainty, the college isomorphized mimetically. Retrenchment in the college incorporated language and strategies that the central administration identified as important, as well as to organizational structures located in the field. Thus, the college could acquire the legitimacy it needed to circumvent possible coercive isomorphic pressures.

The retrenchment of the college was based not only on the internal investigation but also on models and standards at other compatible units and organizations. The university criteria used to define quality, centrality, need, and cost all incorporated this ideal of looking outward to the organizational field to judge the unit's internal performance. However, not all of the changes in structure found elsewhere were adopted in this isomorphic modeling process. The mimetic source was sensitive to the contextual conditions of politics, history, and culture of the college. This sensitivity resulted in some creative differences between what was occurring in other units, regionally and nationally, to that what was instituted at the college and department levels.

Who Decides. Mimetic isomorphism, in contrast to coercive isomorphism, may protect faculty morale. Faculty morale throughout most of the retrenchment appeared to be on a downward spiral. However, near the end of the study there appeared to be some improvements. At the all-college meeting in December 1993, Dean Carroll praised the faculty for the increase in publications and partnerships over past semesters. Further, he stated that the college was ahead of other colleges on campus in meeting its assessed proportion of the university's development funds. That faculty were back to being focused on teaching and research, rather than on funding cuts, may be a key reason for the improvement. However, the type of isomorphic pressure cannot be ignored, especially given the comparison to retrenchment at other universities.

A grim picture of the faculty morale is presented in Kerlin and Dunlap's (1993) analysis of the 1991 retrenchment at the University of Oregon (UO). Similarities and differences are apparent between retrenchment at SU and [End Page 267] UO. First, both began with a strategic planning process carried out by a campus-wide task force. Second, both universities established guidelines for unit quality based on the examination of similar programs across the nation. Third, both institutions had suffered funding reductions for several years from their state legislatures. However, in 1991 UO received a large reduction of around 10%, and the administration took a strong role in determining cuts at that point. Pronounced coercion characterized the retrenchment at UO. Both public officials and the private sector provided support for the "high technology fields of the physical sciences, computer science, and business" (Kerlin & Dunlap, 1993, p. 352), effectively sanctioning other disciplines. The high-technology fields remained largely unscathed by the retrenchment, while nationally recognized units in other disciplines received large cuts or were dismantled. According to Kerlin and Dunlap, the university's programs, faculty, and students, even administration, were victims of imposed retrenchment that was insensitive to much of the organization's political, historical, and cultural context. Thus, coercive isomorphism appears much more damaging to participants' morale than mimetic isomorphism.

At the Lowest Level. At SU, coercion as an isomorphic pressure cannot be discounted, for the university was largely controlled by state regulations and state funding; however, the size, formulation, and distribution of the cuts indicate less coercion than UO experienced. Coercion also entered into SU's retrenchment at the department level, as failure to abide by accreditation standards would have resulted in the loss of accreditation--a concern which surfaced in faculty meetings. However, for the most part, the faculty's concern was not over losing accreditation as much as with giving students a quality education, a goal which the faculty perceived as occurring through remaining in compliance with guidelines. The normative pressures were most pronounced in the department meetings. Most of their discussion centered on determining accreditation guidelines to the policies, procedures, and programs in the department. The faculty approached decisions using the rationalist model.

To Believe or Not to Believe

A belief in rationalism is deeply ingrained in modern society (Meyer & Rowan, 1991) and was an integral and inherent part of retrenchment at SU. Evidence of this belief is seen in the language, tone, and intent of the documentation, memoranda, committee conversations, and interviews. Individuals at all levels made multiple and honest efforts to determine and implement into the college's structure and practices that which was legitimated externally as objectives. Additionally, retrenchment outcomes that did not conform to structures and practices that were legitimated externally (i.e., institutionalized) but were based upon the context of the college were discussed, [End Page 268] justified, and grounded in rationalist objectivity. The retrenchment at SU was characterized by rationalist language and rationalized strategies; thus, it resembles the retrenchment at other universities written about in the literature over past three decades.

Chaffee (1983) clearly argues that the rational model possesses symbolic value in decision making in higher education because faculty and administrators subscribe to the value of objectivity. However, Hardy (1988) concludes her discussion of retrenchment at the University of Montreal, Canada, by stating: "Excellence in universities is the product of excellence in people. It requires innovative and often risky recruitment decisions, and the provision of enough flexibility to allow individuals to be creative and innovative. . . . Increasing controls, quantifying output, and pursuing predominantly economic goals may remove that flexibility" (p. 169). Other scholars studying retrenchment have also documented and commented upon the problems associated with applying the rational model in the university retrenchment: increased time in coordination and decision making, greater control by central administration in decision making, increased distortion in information, decreased faculty morale, and reduced entrepreneurship (Hardy, 1990; Kerlin & Dunlap, 1993; Parker, 1986; Petrie & Alpert, 1983; Rubin, 1977; Schmidtlein, 1990; Slaughter, 1993). What these scholars have discussed is the conflict between the requirements of a rational process and the needs of a retrenching university. Thus, the limitations of the rational model have been made explicit in the literature, not only in explaining, describing, and predicting retrenchment, but also as a process methodology for successful retrenchment. Petrie and Alpert (1983) provide a revealing discussion on the limitations of the rational model for retrenchment in higher education.

What does this mean for those engaging in retrenchment or who must retrench in the future? Two important implications emerged from this analysis of the retrenchment at SU. The first develops further the literature's attention to the tensions inherent in applying the rational model to university retrenchment. However, the conflict that I found important is based on a paradox within the rational model itself which is exacerbated by fiscal uncertainty. The second implication relates to the issue of legitimacy garnished from ceremonial conformity to institutionalized structures and practices.

Internal Tension. Besides objectivity, rationalism draws on the values of efficiency and effectiveness. Although Provost Meeks commended this college's retrenchment as exemplary, it was not because of the process's efficiency. To reach an objective decision, the faculty gathered, synthesized, and evaluated as much information as possible from as many sources as possible. These tasks occupied faculty and administrators for many hours, days, and even weeks, preventing them from pursuing other activities in teaching, research, and service. The faculty members I interviewed consistently [End Page 269] spoke with resentment about how their duties had been neglected because of retrenchment or spoke with longing of getting back to their teaching and research. Additionally, faculty commented that as a result of the retrenchment they now had to learn to deal with new people, structures, and procedures. Thus, a striking contradiction exists between the rhetoric of making the college more efficient and effective in the services that it provided and the frustrations of the faculty with the new realities brought about by retrenchment. In other words, the college's efficiency and effectiveness were reduced at a time when they were the most desired qualities of campus units.

Adaptations. Interviewed faculty also commented that the Partnership Center had reduced the college's efficiency. Using institutional theory, Tolbert's (1985) investigation of patterns of administrative offices in public and private institutions of higher education found support for the argument that dependence upon public funding sources "predicts the proliferation of administrative offices only when the dependencies are not aligned with traditional patterns" (p. 11). As partnerships provide a nontraditional source of funding, they have not been institutionalized. Thus, an office had to be developed to manage these relations. The emergence of the Partnership Center to mediate, coordinate, and initiate this relationship between the faculty and public and private organizations can be understood in these terms.

However, Tolbert (1985) also found that administrative components were adopted independent of the level of financial support for those components. As has already been discussed, many other colleges were adopting partnership-style centers. The college administration (but also some faculty members) viewed the adoption of the center as a rational way of dealing with the needed relationships called partnerships as others were doing, despite the uncertainty of the relationship between the existence of a center and the development of new partnership outreach activities. Thus, Tolbert's reference to a "ceremonial inclusion" of externally sanctioned components into the organizational structure should not be forgotten as an explanation for the new center.

Meyer and Rowan (1978) also discuss the ceremonial employment of externally sanctioned structures and practices. They argue that adopting institutionalized elements results in organizational legitimacy, stability, and resource acquisition. The PRU criteria, aspects of the new structure, and the new mission all conformed to externally sanctioned (i.e., rationalized institutional elements) found in the organizational field. Provost Meeks's comments at the all-college meeting in December 1993 suggest that the college's legitimacy was enhanced, even saved, by its retrenchment efforts. Thus, retrenchment can be understood not only as a process of reorganizing but also as a process for creating legitimacy. [End Page 270]

Conclusion

In many ways the retrenchment at SU resembles retrenchment at other universities described in the literature. A strong administrative stance at SU articulated the need for difficult and rational decisions due to failing financial support. This case study adds to the literature by focusing on issues raised but not addressed in Slaughter's (1993) multi-organizational analysis. Slaughter further does not comment on the isomorphic pressures in the market that surfaced in university retrenchment nor identify how the pressures produced homogeneous changes in university restructuring. Additionally, Slaughter's theory and evidence do not advance an explanation for the role that rationalism plays in university retrenchment. Therefore, this study differs from previous case studies in that it draws on data gathered during and after reorganization, while also using institutional theory to understand these issues of isomorphism, homogeneity, and rationalism in university retrenchment.

All three isomorphic pressures were present in the retrenchment of SU: coercive, mimetic, and normative. The restructuring of the university took place in a context of financial uncertainty. The Policy on Retrenchment of Units (PRU), the guiding document for retrenchment at SU, instituted a practice of comparing units within the university to similar units within the organization, region, and nation. Such a policy fostered mimetic isomorphism. Faculty in the College of Human Development expended much effort in determining what was occurring in their organizational field and how to reshape the college's structures accordingly. Retrenchment at SU, at least for the college studied, focused on looking and behaving like other similar units.

Since the analysis includes data from a single university, this study is limited in its ability to explicitly measure the extent to which the college's conformance resulted in increased homogeneousness with other organizations in the organizational field. However, the PRU criteria of quality, centrality, need, and cost incorporated this idea of comparing units with other units. Therefore, while the statement is weak, it can be argued that the evidence presented by the college to the central administration must have demonstrated enough similarity between its units and others to persuade central administrators to continue funding levels and not to impose the significant cuts to the college that were rumored and desired by others on campus. The mimetic isomorphism did result in homogeneous changes but in ways and areas that were sensitive to the college's history, politics, and culture. There appears to be a link between this sensitivity and the morale of the faculty. Further research is needed, but restructuring that uses mimetic isomorphism may not create the level of distress and reduce faculty morale as much as retrenchment efforts dominated by coercive isomorphism. [End Page 271]

Coercive isomorphism, theoretically, arises when an organization experiences problems with its legitimacy. The College of Human Development at the beginning of the retrenchment period determined that its legitimacy was in question. Yet by the end of the semester after the reorganization of the college, the college was heralded by the central administration as the exemplar for other colleges on the campus. No sanctions had been imposed, only the threat of sanctions. By restructuring mimetically, the college obtained legitimacy.

The perception that accrediting bodies might take potential coercive action also influenced retrenchment decisions. However, the faculty defined accreditation standards as providing the best educational experience for students. Thus, accreditation maintained a normative isomorphic influence that was most evident at the departmental level. The coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphic pressures discussed and detailed in this case study provide insights on how the organizational field (a concept related to but more specific than Slaughter's market) constrained retrenchment at this university and how these pressures influenced this university to behave in ways similar to other universities.

The case study also extends the understanding of the role of rationalism in retrenchment. The literature argues that rationalism is analytically poor both for explaining retrenchment and as a model for the retrenchment process itself. Recognizing these limitations, scholars have advanced a modified rational model--a model that Slaughter dismisses. Efficiency and effectiveness are two concepts primary in the rational model. Of specific interest to this study was the institutional theorists' argument that, in an environment where a belief in rationalism is prominent, an organization's survival may depend more on other factors than on the efficiency in determining, implementing, and producing products and services. The key concept for acquiring resources is not efficiency or effectiveness, but legitimacy. Legitimacy for an organization is associated, particularly when ambiguity is present, with conformance to and the adoption of structures and practices located in other similar institutions in the organizational field. Therefore, the restructuring that resulted from this retrenchment may have reduced the efficiency of the college (i.e., adopting the Partnership Center, splitting a graduate program between departments, creating departments with more faculty, and consuming many hours of the faculty in meetings), but such structures and practices were externally sanctioned and were seen as moving the college in the right direction. The rational model may not account for much of the retrenchment, but the faculty's and administrations' belief in rationalism does. Viewed from this perspective, retrenchment is more about creating legitimacy than improving efficiency.

A final word about the significance of this study. Chaffee (1983) states that, out of the many models of decision making, none will be "mutually [End Page 272] exclusive nor exhaustive as event descriptors. A single decision process may show signs of two or more models simultaneously" (p. 403). Rather, she states that the best use of models is in making decision makers aware of both their preferences and their behaviors, thus allowing for clearer analyses of problems and alternatives. This case study has shown that the institutional model provides a sound tool for discerning the preferences and behaviors of both administrators and faculty engaged in retrenchment. Institutional theory, therefore, should be used to clarify problems and alternatives in retrenchment. Slaughter calls for such a conceptual focus as university retrenchment impacts not only the lives of students, faculty, staff, and administration in significant ways but also the larger American society.

Gordon S. Gates is Acting Branch Campus Coordinator at Washington State University, in Pullman. His current research focuses on the relationship between emotionality and rationality. Research and theory that connect human emotion to rational throught and behavior are used to develop understanding of self-directed learning, diversity education, and organizational leadership in postsecondary education. Interest in this topic also extends to qualitative methods and its implications for researcher subjectivity.

Note

1. As requested by participants, pseudonyms are used for university, college, and faculty.

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